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INTRODUCTION
While the housing problem in the United States has changed since Franklin
Delano Roosevelt proclaimed that "one-third ofthe nation is ill-housed," it has by no
means disappeared. 1 For most low-income people, and to a lesser extent for moderate
income people, housing still presents formidable problems. A sampling ofnewspaper
headlines from the past few years highlights the types ofhousing issues facing
millions ofAmericans:
"Elderly Couple Forced to Move as Building Goes Condo"
"Interest Rates Soar"
'The Search for Rental Housing"
"Fear ofDisplacement Widespread in South End"
"Rent Control is Hotly Debated in City Council"
"Defaults in Subsidized Housing PromptHUD to Question Next Move"
"Drop in Housing Starts Concerns Building Industry"
"Family of Six Lives in Bus in Junkyard"
"Reagan Outs Assisted Housing"
Academics and housing analysts recognize four major aspects of the housing
problem: affordability (ratio ofhousing costs to income), adequacy (including quality
and overcrowding), neighborhood conditions, and availability. Over the past decade,
the nature of the country's housing problem has undergone some important
transformations.
Until ten years ago the phrase "housing problem" conjured up images oflow
quality housing and overcrowded conditions that were principally the concern of low-
income and minority people. By the late 1970s, however, a new aspect of the housing
problem-affordability-had become fixed in the American consciousness. Since that
time there has been general agreement among housing analysts that the burden of
housing costs relative to income has gotten worse, while overall quality has
improved. Although blacks and other minorities have benefited from these
improvements, their housing situations remain considerably worse than those ofthe
general population. For example, black households have:
• Higher shelter-to-income ratios;
• Lower rates ofhome ownership;
• Higher incidence ofoccupancy in physically inadequate housing;
• Higher risks ofbeing displaced from their homes due to various public
(highways and urban redevelopment) as well as private (condo conversions)
actions; and
• Reduced access to available units due to discrimination.
In recent years there has been considerable debate on one key aspect of the
housing problem: the adequacy ofthe supply of low-cost housing. On one hand, a
HUD report asserted that "[tjhere is no current nationwide shortage in the rental ,
housing market" (1981, p. ii). While admitting that "there are adverse conditions for
rental housing existing in some local areas," the report concluded that "the rental
housing market is not currently in a crisis state on a national level" (1981, p. 3).
Several noted housing economists have come to similar conclusions. For example, Ira
Lowry claimed that he was "unable to find persuasive evidence of a general shortage
of rental housing " (1981, p. 35).
On the other hand, some housing analysts (Sternlieb and Hughes, 1981; Goetze,
1983) and even government agencies (GAO, 1979) have argued that there is a lack of
affordable rental units, particularly for lower income and large families. The debate
has become so confusing that a 1983 report by the Brookings Institution, seemingly
all at the same time, predicted a shortfall of rental units, denied that the shortfall can
actually persist, and admitted that it could take the market some time "before
adjustments can take place" (Downs, 1983, p. 127).
Rhetoric aside, data generated in many locales-in addition to the observations
and experiences ofmost renters-point in the direction of rental housing shortages. In
Boston, New York, San Francisco, and many other large cities, the rental vacancy
rate, particularly for low and moderately priced units, is well below 5%, the generally
accepted minimum that is needed to support household mobility (Achtenberg, 1982;
Hartman, 1983; Liebert,1983). Although alarming, vacancy rate data do not tell the
whole story. Available units that are the right size must be located in the right
places and must be affordable to those who need shelter. (Hartman, 1983). Further,
even when vacant units and needy households are matched, the possibility that
discrimination will limit access still poses very real problems (Feins and Bratt, 1983).
The issue of homelessness, which has attracted considerable media attention in
recent years, puts the controversy around whether or not there are shortages of
housing in human terms.
What, if anything, should be done? Increasingly, the answer being given is "not
much." Citing a "lack of evidence ofhousing market failure," Frank de Leeuw, chief
statistician ofthe U.S. Department of Commerce, has stated: "the rental crisis, such
as it is, does not warrant any special rental housing market remedies" (1981, p. 64).
The President's Commission on Housing neatly summed up the conservative position
on the role ofgovernment in the housing market in the following manner: "[T]he
genius of the market economy, freed of the distortions forced by government housing
policies, . . . can provide for housing far better than Federal programs" (1982, p. xvii).
According to this position, all that is called for in terms of government intervention is
a program that will increase effective demand. (Proponents of this position often arm
themselves with criticisms of the long-standing subsidized production programs.2 )
Direct cash vouchers or housing allowances that enable lower income
households to rent units on the private market have also been proposed and
supported by many academics and policymakers as a solution to the housing shortage
problem (Aaron,1972; Solomon, 1974; President's Commission on Housing, 1982;
Downs, 1983). In recent years, this idea has been translated into public policy.3
However, even the most ardent proponents of this approach admit that it would
neither substantially improve the quality ofthe existing stock, nor stimulate the
construction ofmuch low-income housing (HUD, 1980a; President's Commission on
Housing, 1982).
This paper takes the view that there have been no serious restrictions imposed
on the private market that have thwarted its ability to provide housing for low-
income people,4 and that the unassisted private housing market is simply not the
answer. Even the President's Commission on Housing bluntly stated that "the
private market has been unwilling or unable to house many ofthese [low-income,
single-parent, minority and large] families
. .
." (1982, p. 31).
Since we cannot rely on the private market to respond to the housing needs of
low-income people without public incentives, there is a clear need for the public sector
to play a major role. What, then, are the options for increasing the supply (either
through new construction or substantial rehabilitation) of low-rent housing? Thus
far, two broad public policies have been pursued in this country: private housing
production with public incentives and direct production ownership ofhousing by the
public sector.
Private Housing Production with Public Incentives
Starting in 1959 the first in a series ofprograms that provided financial
incentives to private builders ofmultifamily housing was enacted. Section 202
provided direct government loans at below-market interest rates to nonprofit
builders of elderly housing. Section 221(d)(3), enacted in 1961, authorized the federal
government, through the Federal National Mortgage Association, to purchase
mortgages at a 3% interest rate. For-profit or nonprofit developers were eligible to
receive these low-interest loans. Section 236, enacted in 1968, also authorized
interest rate subsidies. Instead of the public financing arrangement ofthe Section
221(d)(3) program, the Section 236 subsidy lowered the interest rate on mortgages,
which were provided by private financial institutions, to as low as 1%. The Section 8
New Construction Program, enacted in 1974, replaced the Section 236 program.
Under Section 8, developers constructed new or substantially rehabilitated rental
units for lower-income people. Tenants paid 25-30%5 of their income for rent with the
difference between this amount and HUD-established "fair market rents" supplied as
a subsidy by the government. The Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983
included no new authorizations for this program. (Another component of the Section
8 program provided a similar subsidy for households renting existing units on the
private market-the Section 8 Existing Housing Program. This program is still
operational. Also see note 3). By late 1978, over 6,700 federally subsidized housing
projects had been built through the Section 221(d)(3)and 236 programs, representing
over 600,000 units of housing (HUD, 1980b). The Section 202 and Section 8 New
Construction Program have contributed over 100,000 and over 700,000 units,
respectively (HUD, 1978a; Maffin, 1983).
Direct Production and Ownership ofHousing by the Public Sector
There has been only one major housing program in the United States that has
involved direct production and ownership by the public sector. The Public Housing
Program, created by the United States Housing Act of 1937, authorized local housing
authorities to construct and manage low-cost housing. Capital was raised by floating
tax-exempt bonds, which were purchased by private investors. The federal
government contracted to pay the principal and interest on these notes over a 40-year
period. Thus, the federal government covered the long-term debt financing while
ownership and management were vested in local public agencies. In 1969, Congress
enacted the first in a series ofoperating subsidies that protected tenants from rising
maintenance and energy costs.
Launched as a post-depression recovery measure to stimulate the construction
industry and to reduce unemployment, public housing has always had a host of
vociferous opponents. From the outset, conservative critics labeled it a "socialist
program" and denounced the reliance on the public sector for providing a good that
could be produced by the private market (Friedman, 1968). Others have pointed to
the poor design of public housing buildings and high operating costs as justifications
for abandoning the program. Although there has been relatively little construction
of public housing over the past 15 years, since the program's inception, over 1.2
million units have been built.
Program Observations
What have been the experiences of the subsidized multifamily production
programs? Very briefly, based on previous review and comparative studies by this
author (Bratt, 1985; Bratt, forthcoming), the following are some of the most relevant
observations.
• Subsidized multifamily housing can be good housing, and there are
generally high levels of satisfaction among tenants in subsidized
developments.
• A comparison of the two main types ofsubsidized housing-privately owne,d
housing produced with public incentives and public housing-reveals that
the latter has proved more successful because of its ability to provide
generally decent quality, financially viable housing with a historically
clear public purpose. In addition, public housing is more available to
minorities and families with very low incomes than are other subsidy
programs.
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• Both types of subsidized housing programs also have some serious
problems. The Public Housing Program has been criticized because of poor
design and management, a high incidence of racial segregation, and
inadequate funding to meet operating and modernization costs.
• In the privately owned subsidized developments, problems also have
,
resulted from poor construction and management and inadequate operating
reserves. In addition, this approach has some serious built-in drawbacks.
For instance, because length ofuse restrictions (the time during which the
housing must be used exclusively by low-income tenants) are limited in
such developments, privately owned subsidized housing can eventually be
sold off and used for non-low-income use. In addition, numerous
foreclosures in the publicly subsidized, privately owned developments (i.e.,
Sections 221 (d)(3) and 236) have forced HUD to assume ownership and
dispose ofmany buildings. Unfortunately, HUD has sacrificed public
purpose goals and allowed scores of projects to be bought by for-profit
developers for market rate use.
The Role of Community-Based Groups
Although nonprofit and community-based groups have sponsored some housing
under the Section 221(d)(3), 236, and 8 programs, these efforts were relatively minor
compared to the strategies of production already discussed. As a result, the potential
for a community-based housing strategy has not been fully explored. The main focus
of this paper is on community-based initiatives that have rehabilitated and produced
subsidized housing. However, in order to gain a fuller appreciation for the overall
approach the first section provides an overview of three additional types of
community-based housing initiatives: management and conversion of subsidized
housing; rehabilitation and conversion of private rental housing; and home
ownership and home ownership support programs. The second section ofthe paper
presents an in-depth view ofthe historical and contemporary role ofnonprofits and
community-based groups in rehabilitating and producing subsidized housing. In the
third section, I present a brief assessment ofthe overall community-based housing
strategy, using the following criteria:
• Ability to provide direct housing assistance;
• Potential for producing social and community benefits;
• Potential for producing benefits to individuals;
• Ease of implementation;
• Likelihood of producing benefits that outweigh costs;
• Potential for replication; and
• Ability to affect the root causes of the problem being addressed.
The fourth section of this paper outlines a model support system for community-
based housing initiatives. The fifth and sixth sections trace the growth of a set of
state agencies in Massachusetts that have evolved into an impressive support system
for community-based housing. The Massachusetts experience is instructive because
it serves as an example ofhow the public sector can provide "top-down" supports to
"bottom-up" community-based housing activities. Seventh, and finally, I offer a
series ofobservations, drawn from the Massachusetts experience, about the potential
for creating additional public support systems for community-based housing.
OVERVIEW OF COMMUNITY-BASED HOUSING INITIATIVES
By 1978, it appeared that the federal government was ready to embrace self-
help and local initiative as a new ingredient in its housing and community
development programs. While citizen participation had been a mandated component
of federal programs for decades, President Carter's urban policy and the subsequent
enactment ofthe Neighborhood Self-Help Development Act (NSHD) and the
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Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation Act, both in 1978, seemed to guarantee a
role for grassroots, community-based efforts.6
In announcing the first round offunding under NSHD in the spring of 1980,
Geno C. Baroni, assistant secretary ofHUD's Office ofNeighborhoods, Voluntary
Associations and Consumer Protection (now disbanded), emphasized the rationale for
supporting locally-based initiatives:
We know these projects will have a major impact on their communities because
they were conceived and initiated by the people in the neighborhoods they will
serve. These groups are deeply rooted in their neighborhoods and they are
uniquely capable ofdeveloping projects to meet the needs of their own areas.
(HUD, 1980c)
Despite the appeal ofBaroni's argument and the subsequent success ofNSHD
(Mayer, 1984), President Reagan removed this program from the federal agenda
early in his first term. Furthermore, with the phase-out ofthe Section 8 New
Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation programs in the early 1980s
community-based housing efforts face an uncertain future. Nevertheless, these
initiatives have, over the past 20 years, produced an array of diverse housing
programs that are instructive for several reasons: they offer provocative solutions to
complex housing problems; they provide further evidence ofthe desperate need for
decent, affordable housing; and they underscore the potential of a wider scale
community-based housing strategy.
Community-based housing programs can be defined as efforts in which
members of a community group or tenants join together to produce, rehabilitate,
and/or manage housing. The central feature of such programs is that control and
often ownership of the housing is in the hands of the individuals who live in the
housing or the community. These efforts can be distinguished from other forms of
community action that have resulted in legislative or regulatory initiatives (e.g.,
Community Reinvestment Act,7 local rent control, and condominium conversion
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ordinances). Community-based housing programs directly provide housing, or
services or resources that are needed for housing; legislative initiatives depend on
other actors to change their mode ofoperation to make housing more available or
affordable.
Community-based housing programs usually rely on considerable funding and
technical assistance from outside sources. In this sense, they are not strictly self-
help. Self-help efforts that are dependent on individuals helping themselves or each
other in an informal context-such as through home repairs or renovations-will not be
considered here. Instead, only those activities that are carried out through a formal
or semi-formal arrangement or organizational framework will be examined.
Management and Conversion of Subsidized Housing
Frustrations with public housing and other publicly subsidized housing
programs have stimulated community groups to undertake management of
developments. Perhaps the most well-known example oftenant-managed public
housing developments is in St. Louis. In that city, tenant management corporations
(TMCs) oversee the operation ofmore than 3,000 apartments in five family
developments. Robert Kolodny has written the following about St. Louis' TMCs:
An independent evaluation of the mature program has not been made, but there
seems little question that the TMCs have mastered traditional real estate
management They [the TMCs] have overseen substantial upgrading ofthe
projects, which they inherited in an advanced state ofunder-occupancy and
physical deterioration. (1981a, p. 137)
Based on the experiences in St. Louis, as well as TMC programs in at least five
other cities, HUD launched a three-year demonstration oftenant management in
1976 (Struyk, 1980). The results ofthe national program appear to parallel those
reported in St. Louis:
The National Tenant Management demonstration has shown that management
by tenants is a feasible alternative to conventional public housing management
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under certain conditions. In the majority of the demonstration sites, the tenant
participants-all long-time residents oflow-income public housing, most
unemployed, and the majority black and female family heads-mastered in three
years the skills necessary to assume management responsibility for the housing
developments in which they lived The evaluation of tenant management on
a series ofmeasured standard performance indicators such as rent collection
and the quality and timeliness ofmaintenance, shows that the residents were
able to manage their developments as well as prior management had and, in so
doing, to provide employment for some tenants and increase the overall
satisfaction of the general resident population. (Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation, 1981, p. 239)
Despite the positive results, the report also indicated that the additional costs of
tenant management were not justified. Yet, for most ofthe localities involved, tenant
management was continued even after HUD's supplemental funds were exhausted,
operations have continued to improve, and, over the past few years, additional TMCs
have been formed (Kolodny, 1985). Kolodny has concluded that:
Tenant management is not an unalloyed success, but in surviving and to some
extent prospering at most of the sites where it has been introduced, it shows
more potential and usefulness than it is generally given credit for Ifthe
objectives . . . oflow rent housing . . . include local empowerment, expanded
employment opportunities for residents, leadership development, and some
progress toward the revitalization ofseverely depressed residential districts,
then tenant management would seem to have substantial ifnot fully realized
possibilities. (1983, p. 68)
Another community-based housing program involving subsidized multifamily
housing is the conversion ofdevelopments to tenant or community ownership.
Although it is noteworthy that the Boston area is rich with examples ofsuch
conversion projects, innovation has been born from necessity. Out of a total of 14,000
multifamily subsidized housing units that have been built or rehabilitated in Boston
over the past two decades, about half are currently confronting serious financial
difficulties, with tenants facing substantial rent increases or displacement (Citizens
Housing and Planning Association, 1980). In one such development, Warren
Gardens, HUD became the owner following foreclosure and the tenants assumed
control as a cooperative. The process was facilitated by the Citizens Housing and
13
Planning Association, a local nonprofit housing advocacy group, and was made
possible by the availability of Section 8 rental assistance.
The way in which a tenant cooperative is structured has important
implications. If it is a limited-equity cooperative, members are guaranteed security
and all other rights ofhome ownership; shares, however, are prevented from
inflating along with the general market. In this way, the housing units are
maintained as a permanent resource for low-income households. Without this
safeguard, subsidized housing could be lost for future generations oflow-income
households.
There are also some examples ofHUD transferring the titles of foreclosed
multifamily developments to community, as opposed to tenant, groups. Urban Edge,
a community-based housing organization located in the Jamaica Plain section of
Boston, has acquired several HUD-foreclosed buildings and currently operates them
as rental housing.
Rehabilitation and Conversion of Private Rental Housing
In recent years, the threat ofdisplacement due to gentrification and conversion
of rental housing to high cost condominiums has stimulated tenant and community
activism. For example, Jubilee Housing, a community group operating in a
gentrifying neighborhood in Washington, D.C., has purchased and rehabilitated
multifamily buildings without using federal subsidies. Depending primarily on
donated time and money from private individuals and foundations, Jubilee owns and
operates six buildings with a total of 213 units. In Boston, tenants of a 12-unit
building formed a limited equity cooperative, First Fenway Cooperative, and bought
their building from a private owner. Sympathetic to tenants' fears that purchase of
the building by a private investor might force their displacement, the owner even
agreed to accepting a lower price from the tenant group.
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In other locales, community concerns over displacement have stimulated public
actions that are also aimed at providing direct assistance and resources to tenants.
For example,.in Washington, D.C., the local Department ofHousing and Community
Development responded to tenants whose buildings were on the verge ofbeing sold to
new investors. Between 1979 and 1983, the D.C. government helped 46 tenant
groups convert their buildings to cooperatives (about four-fifths ofwhich are limited
equity) by providing loans and technical assistance. Although a systematic
assessment ofthe program has not been made, a recent report claimed that physical
conditions have improved and that the buildings are safer and cleaner than they were
under the management ofthe previous owners. (Black, 1984).
Despite an increase in organizing around displacement issues, tenants in
private rental housing who have organized housing initiatives have usually done so
only after the landlord has severely neglected the building and has abandoned most,
ifnot all, management functions. Often, the city has either acquired the property for
tax arrearages, or is in the process ofdoing so.
It is not surprising that New York City, with the highest number of abandoned
buildings in the country, is the site of the most varied and comprehensive approaches
for dealing with end-stage problems in the private rental housing stock. While some
ofNew York's programs are now administered through the city, much of the impetus
for their creation came from tenant and neighborhood organization (Hartman et al.,
1982). Two types ofprograms dealing with end-stage problems can be distinguished,
although conversion of rental housing to cooperatives is common to both: cooperative
conversion with and without sweat equity; and cooperative conversion with
management training.
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Cooperative Conversion with and without Sweat Equity
New York's cooperative conversion and sweat equity rehabilitation programs
emerged as a result oftenant frustration with buildings that had been abandoned by
the private sector. Such rehabilitation programs developed, then, as part ofthe
tenants' efforts to salvage their homes. According to Robert Kolodny, the coop
conversion program emerged "primarily in response to the demands oftenants who
had sustained their buildings for a period themselves but who needed the financing to
upgrade the buildings and the leverage to gain permanent control ofthem at nominal
cost" (Kolodny, 1981b, p. 56).
As of 1973, 37 projects with nearly 2,100 units were either completed or in the
process of rehabilitation and cooperative conversion. Sumka and Blackburn (1982)
estimated that ultimately fewer than 50 buildings were converted to low-income
cooperatives in the entire city. While a formal evaluation of the program has not
been done, Kolodny (1981b) has offered the following summation:
Although many projects apparently failed, others prospered in very unlikely
circumstances. [In the coops that are doing well,] all the basic indicators of
effective management are there: low vacancy rates, limited turnover, long
waiting lists, good building maintenance, and general resident satisfaction,
(pp. 57-58)
The successes ofmany ofthese initiatives are particularly noteworthy in view of
the lack of any organized system ofsupport for tenants. While "it was not surprising
that many could not hold on and sustain what they had started[,] . . . the potential for
a large-scale mutual aid strategy represented by these efforts was impressive"
(Kolodny, 1985).
In sweat equity-projects (also knows as urban homesteading), community
people donate their own labor to rehabilitate abandoned, usually city-owned,
buildings, which they eventually own as cooperatives. Here the goals ofhousing and
tenant ownership are merged with the potential ofjob training and employment.
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Despite the immediate appeal of this approach, sweat equity projects have been
difficult to implement. As of 1981, between 500 and 1,000 units constituted the
entire sweat equity effort in New York City (Sumka and Blackburn, 1982; Kolodny,
1985).
A nonprofit agency, the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB), has
been pivotal in sustaining the sweat equity and coop conversion programs in New
York. Established in 1974, UHAB provides tenant and community groups with
technical assistance and support, in addition to acting as an intermediary with the
city.
Cooperative Conversion with Management Training
New York's "alternative management programs" have been described by
Kolodny (1981b). One of the most innovative, the Tenant Interim Lease Program,
involves direct management by tenants ofcity-owned buildings if three-fifths of the
residents sign a petition requesting it. After an 11-month trial period, tenants are
offered the opportunity to assume ownership as a cooperative. The results have been
encouraging: rent collections have averaged 90% compared to 63% for other city-
managed properties, and tenant satisfaction has increased. Further, it has been
found that buildings in this program require a lower expenditure by the city than
those managed centrally by city staff(Hurwitz, 1982). As ofJanuary 1, 1985, 130
buildings with 3,470 units had been sold to tenant cooperatives. An additional 293
buildings were being managed by residents,with the hope that they would be
converted to coops (Kolodny, 1985).
Another innovative New York program aimed at trying to salvage city-owned,
but formerly private, rental housing is the Community Management Program. In
this approach, a community group enters into a contract with the city to manage
several buildings in its area. Buildings in this program usually have fewer occupied
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units than buildings in the Tenant Interim Lease Program and are more
deteriorated. But the objectives of the two programs are similar: to improve
management through a tenant or community-based effort and to eventually enable
tenants to obtain ownership as a cooperative. A total of 27 coops, with 485 units,
have already been created, with another 149 properties still in the program (Kolodny,
1985).
Despite the successes, problems do exist. Increasing the capacity oftenant and
community groups to carry out management functions is a slow, difficult process and
it is not yet known whether long-term tenant or community ownership will be
achieved. At the very least, however, such programs provide options for low-income
people who are desperate for decent housing, while enabling community residents
and tenants to gain valuable experience in housing management.
Undoubtedly one ofthe successes ofNew York City's cooperative conversion
programs is that they stimulated a federal demonstration. The "Section 510 demo,"
which derived its legal authority from 1978 amendments to the 1970 Housing Act,
authorized HUD to determine the feasibility ofexpanding home ownership
opportunities in urban areas, giving special attention to the use ofmultifamily
housing. Seven cities were chosen to carry out multifamily housing rehabilitation
projects. Under the direct control ofthe city, private developers and community
groupsjointly rehabilitated buildings that were then transferred to cooperative or
condominium ownership. Unlike the original model, pioneered in New York, the
demonstration did not include sweat equity. Instead, it depended on Section 8 or
other subsidies to lower the ultimate costs to tenants.
A recent evaluation ofthe "510 demo" concluded that none of the demonstration
projects was an unqualified success. Even in the most successful project, low-income
cooperative ownership could only be achieved with subsidies for nearly two-thirds of
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the development costs and long-term Section 8 subsidies for a majority ofthe tenants
(Sumka, 1984). Yet, on balance, the report concluded:
The 510 demonstrations showed that a developer-community group partnership
could be made to work It also showed that low-income cooperatives can be
created to the benefit of the residents of inner-city neighborhoods . . . but that
such projects will not bear fruit without the considerable effort and dedication of
the program staff. (Sumka, 1984)
In a second HUD demonstration, also based on New York's experiences, six
cities were selected to undertake sweat equity rehabilitation programs. Sumka and
Blackburn (1982) found that the results ofthe demonstration were mixed with only
two cities establishing ongoing multifamily homesteading programs. Thus, while it
is significant thatHUD attempted to replicate locally initiated ideas, the multifamily
sweat equity and coop conversion programs were not easily repeated in other areas.
Home Ownership and Home Ownership Support Programs
Two major types ofcommunity-based home ownership and home ownership
support programs can be identified: small-scale home ownership and counseling
programs; and reinvestment funds.
Small-Scale Home Ownership and Counseling Programs
Because the federal government offered no home ownership opportunities for
lower income families until the late 1960s, many community groups prior to that
period organized their own home ownership programs. As early as 1945, an
Indianapolis settlement house initiated a sweat equity housing construction program
known as Flanner House Homes, Inc. Through this program between 1950 and 1965,
366 families participated in the construction of their homes, with each family's work
assessed at between 25%-30% of the total value of the house. Similarly, in 1964,
Better Rochester Living, Inc., offered home ownership opportunities to lower income
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families, with rehabilitation work performed by the prospective owners in exchange
for their down payment. While a total of about 500 families were helped to buy
homes through this program, it took a huge amount of administrative and other
support services (much of it unpaid) to make these efforts work (Frieden and
Newman, 1970).
Partly based on the experiences ofthese early programs, the 1968 Housing Act
authorized subsidies for first-time low-income home owners (Section 235). However,
a host ofproblems plagued the program and thousands ofpeople eventually lost their
homes through foreclosure. One of the reasons for this tragic outcome was the lack of
counseling services for participants in the Section 235 program. But long before i
problems emerged, drafters ofthe home ownership program were well aware of the
need for counseling. For example, a 1968 report issued by the U.S. House Committee
on Banking and Currency offered the following rationale:
Since many of the families who would be assisted have had little experience in
the proper care of a home and the budgeting ofincome to meet regular monthly
payments on a mortgage, this section T235] would authorize appropriate
counseling ... to assist these families in meeting their new responsibilities,
(p. 10)
Contrary to this recommendation, counseling never became an integral part of the
235 program and funding for counseling services was consistently omitted in HUD's
budget requests (Bratt, 1976; U.S. Committee on Government Operations, 1976).
Despite the lack of federal support, scores ofvoluntary community-based
counseling agencies attempted to provide the needed services. A few, such as
Housing Now in Hartford, Connecticut, provided cash grants to assist with down
payment and closing costs. More often, however, counseling agencies offered no
direct financial assistance, concentrating only on providing information (HUD,
1975a). Some counseling programs also grew out of the growing default rate in the
Section 235 program and focused on default counseling (HUD, 1975a). Nevertheless,
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without any significant support from the federal government, and with the weight of
other serious problems in the program, the voluntary counseling programs were
generally insufficient. As mentioned above, thousands ofhomes were eventually
foreclosed and, since the mortgages were insured by the Federal Housing Authority
(FHA-an agency within HUD), HUD was faced with the problem ofhow to dispose of
the units. It took HUD months, ifnot years, to dispose of foreclosed properties that
piled up in its inventory at an alarming rate.
In response to a landscape ofboarded up, HUD-owned properties, many
community organizations again attempted to develop home ownership opportunities
for lower income residents. For example, Homeowners Rehab, Inc., in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and the Worcester Cooperation Councils Home Improvement
Program in Worcester, Massachusetts, initiated variations on the earlier sweat
equity programs. Similar to their predecessors, these programs operate on extremely
small scales: less than a dozen families per year are assisted through each agency
(Siegenthaler, 1980). In Philadelphia, community activists launched the Walk-In
Urban Homesteading Program in 1977, the goal ofwhich was to provide people with
homes by reusing some ofthe 40,000 abandoned buildings, many ofthem belonging to
HUD. HUD's opposition to the program slowly gave way to cooperation and by
February 1979-less than two years after a squatting campaign had begun- half of the
200 walk-in homesteaders had obtained legal ownership of their new houses when
HUD deeded the properties to them.
Reinvestment Funds
Redlining-the unwillingness ofbanks to grant home mortgages or loans in
certain areas of a city-has prompted some of the most widely publicized community-
based housing programs. Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS),which started in a
deteriorated, redlined section ofPittsburgh in 1968, was a resident-sponsored
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reinvestment program. Through the neighborhood's own assessment of its problems,
a four-way partnership was forged between the residents, mortgage lenders, the city
(which committed to undertake a code-enforcement program and promised much
needed public services), and a foundation that provided a high risk pool ofmoney for
potential borrowers who were considered ineligible by the banks. By most accounts,
NHS has enjoyed considerable success. Not only has it been credited with stabilizing
the original Pittsburgh NHS Neighborhood, (Ahlbrandt and Brophy, 1975), but it has
also served as a model for scores of additional NHS programs. As of 1983 there were
NHS organizations operating in 182 neighborhoods in 132 cities (Whiteside, 1983)
(also see note 6).
8
In addition to NHS, several other locally-based mortgage funds have been
organized to combat disinvestment. One important example is the Bedford-
Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation's mortgage pool, created in 1968. Responding to
a lack ofmortgage money, the corporation managed to get commitments from 80
financial institutions in New York City to lend $65 million for FHA-insured and VA-
guaranteed mortgages for residents of the Bedford-Stuyvesant area ofBrooklyn
(Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, 1968).
One of the newest and largest reinvestment funds was launched in Chicago in
1984. Using the Community Reinvestment Act as a lever, a coalition ofcommunity
groups, with the assistance of a nonprofit research and technical assistance agency,
the Woodstock Institute, negotiated a $120,000,000 loan commitment from the First
Chicago Corporation (Swift and Pogge, 1984).
Another noteworthy reinvestment program was created in Philadelphia in
1975. There, neighborhood residentsjoined together and protested the unavailability
ofconventional mortgage financing throughout many sections of the city. In
response, 13 of the city's leading financial institutions agreed, in accordance with the
objectives ofthe Philadelphia Mortgage Plan (PMP), to evaluate and analyze
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properties on a case-by-case basis (Long, 1977). As of early 1979, PMP lenders had
made 4,167 loans with a default and foreclosure rate comparable to that of their
suburban portfolios (National Commission on Neighborhoods, 1979). Unlike the
NHS and the other reinvestment programs discussed here, PMP is controlled by the
banks-although community residents helped launch the program and do participate
through a review committee.
The preceding overview ofcommunity-based housing programs reveals the
diversity of approaches adopted by local groups, highlights some ofthe complexity
and difficulty ofpursuing a community-based housing strategy, and underscores a
common theme running throughout the examples: citizens who become involved with
community-based housing initiatives do so because they lack other viable options for
attaining decent, affordable shelter. The following section broadens the overview of
community-based housing by examining the past and present activities of
community-based housing developers.
ROOTS OF COMMUNITY-BASED HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
The current generation ofcommunity-based housing development groups has
several types of ancestors: the early housing philanthropists; the nonprofits of the
1960s; and the community-based sponsors in the 1970s who formed limited
partnerships. Although some groups in the latter two categories overlapped (i.e.,
nonprofits also operated in the 1970s) various types ofcommunity-based housing
groups have been dominant at different times over the last two decades.
The Early Philanthropists
Long before the formal entry of nonprofits on the housing scene in 1959, some
nineteenth century reformers saw the need to limit the amount of profit in low-
income housing. By the turn of the century, a small-scale movement had formed to
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provide model tenement houses-"philanthropy plus 5%."9 The goals ofthe movement
were straightforward: to provide decent housing for the poor while yielding a modest
profit for investors.
The legacy ofthe model tenement movement was mixed. On one hand, such
efforts pioneered design techniques that provided light and air to interior rooms, an
"advance that was in sharp contrast to the tenements being built by speculators"
(Meyerson, Terrett, and Wheaton, 1962, p. 293). On the other hand, some "model"
tenements turned into slums that were as bad as any produced by the private market.
Further, according to Lawrence Veiller, a prominent housing reformer of the period,
speculative builders had been able to produce many more buildings, most ofwhich
were highly objectionable: "for every 13 people who have been provided with model
tenements, 1,000 others have been condemned to live in insanitary ones" (quoted in
Friedman, 1968, p. 86). Catherine Bauer, another key reformer, pointed out that the
economics ofthe model tenement plan were ultimately unworkable. The model
builders wanted "to provide good dwellings on an 'economic' basis at a price which
everyone could pay. . . without disturbing or even questioning any part of the current
social-economic system" (quoted in Friedman, 1968, p. 87). Thus, even at the turn of
the century, it was acknowledged that decent, low-cost housing was a goal that ran
counter to the economic realities ofhousing production. Housing has always been ,
expensive to build and, by definition, low-income households often have inadequate
resources with which to pay the real cost of shelter.
The First Nonprofit Developers: 1960s
From the federal government's entry into subsidized housing in 1937 until
1959, housing for low-income households was produced and managed through local
public housing authorities. However, as described earlier, in 1959 subsidies were
made available to private sponsors of publicly supported housing through Section 202
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and later Section 221 (d)(3) and 236. Although only nonprofits were eligible to
sponsor Section 202 housing, the subsequent programs also permitted and
encouraged participation by private for-profit developers.
Based primarily on the experiences with these programs during the 1960s,
,
nonprofit sponsorship ofmultifamily subsidized housing acquired a generally
negative reputation. Many well-meaning but inexperienced church, civic, and union
groups with little prior experience in housing were often unable to maintain
developments once they built them. In addition, many nonprofit groups were lured
into the projects by for-profit builders, contractors, and consultants who often bailed
out after they pocketed their fees (Keyes, 1971; HUD, 1972). In view ofthese
circumstances, it is not surprising that nonprofit projects failed at two to four times
the rate of for-profit developments (GAO, 1978; Friedland and MacRae, 1979).
In addition to the unique problems confronting nonprofits, some structural
defects in the Section 221 (d)(3) and 236 programs also proved troublesome. Probably
the most significant flaws were the incentive for developers to underestimate
operating costs (in order to enable projects to appear feasible under the terms of the
subsidy programs), the lack of any requirement for funds to be set aside to deal with
unforeseen expenses, and a subsidy formula that could not increase if additional
resources were needed (BRA and BUO, 1973; HUD, 1973; HUD, 1978b; GAO, 1978).
When utility costs skyrocketed in the early 1970s due to the oil crisis, owners of
subsidized housing were faced with several difficult options for trying to meet
increased operating expenses: raise rents, decrease maintenance and management
services, cut into profits, or default on mortgage payments. Different strategies were
chosen to try to keep the projects afloat but, overall, the results were grim: by 1978
less than one third of the subsidized developments were financially sound (HUD,
1978b).
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Although all owners ofsubsidized housing found themselves "between a rock
and a hard place," the dilemma for nonprofit sponsors was even more problematic.
With limited assets, nonprofits didn't even have the option ofusing some of their own
resources to make ends meet. Further, the options of either reducing maintenance or
increasing rents was antithetical to the goals ofthe nonprofit groups. As one
community sponsor ofsubsidized housing who was 15 months behind in mortgage
payments put it, <rWe had to make a decision, do you let people stay cold or do you pay
the mortgage? Who[m] are we to serve, the government or the tenants?" (quoted in
Urban Planning Aid, 1973, p. 41). Thus, when faced with the decision ofwhether to
provide housing services to tenants or to pay debt service to financial institutions,
some nonprofits chose to manage the developments for as long as they could and to
allow the projects to default. This suggests that an important reason behind the
higher financial failure rate for the nonprofits was their desire to operate the
buildings in accordance with their original goals, despite their limited resources.
Although it appears that the social commitment of the nonprofits may have
created a situation that left them vulnerable to criticism, this commitment also
produced a record that had many unequivocal benefits. In terms ofvolume of units
produced, ability to reach low-income people, rentals charged, average number of
bedrooms/unit, willingness to undertake projects in urban renewal areas, and quality
ofmanagement, the early nonprofit housing movement can boast some real successes.
Consider the following:
• By June 1970 nonprofits had sponsored about 28% of all units built under
the Section 221(d)(3) BMIR and 236 programs (Keyes, 197D.10
• Nonprofit sponsors used the rent supplement and the leased housing
programs proportionally more frequently than for-profit developers,
thereby making units more affordable and available to lower income
people (Disario,1969; Keyes, 197D.H
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• A comparison ofnonprofit and for-profit developments in Boston revealed
that tenants in the latter paid lower average rentals (Disario, 1969).
• The above study also found that nonprofit developments had more three,
four, and five bedroom apartments (Disario, 1969).
• Research conducted by HUD disclosed that projects built by nonprofit
sponsors served needier families than those built by limited-dividend
sponsors (HUD, 1975b).l2
• Based on an evaluation in 24 cities, nonprofit sponsors of221 (d)(3)
housing were more likely to undertake projects in urban renewal areas
than for-profit developers (Keyes, 1971).
• Many community-based sponsors openly confronted the toughest housing
issues: central city rehabilitation, utilization ofminority contractors and
developers, and involvement oftenants in management decisions (Keyes,
1971).
• The Urban Institute found that cooperatively owned and nonprofit
housing was, in general, more effectively managed than for-profit
developments (cited in GAO, 1978).
It must also be kept in mind that the early nonprofit housing groups operated in
an institutional setting, which makes these successes even more impressive.
Although the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 included two sections
explicitly aimed at assisting nonprofit groups, HUD did not aggressively administer
the programs and neither was fully utilized. Section 106 (a) authorized funding to
agencies to provide information, advice, and technical assistance to nonprofit groups
involved with housing construction or rehabilitation for low- or moderate-income
families; Section 106 (b) provided "seed money" loans to nonprofit housing sponsors.
It was not until 1972 that HUD set aside $1 million to fund the Section 106 (a)
program. Interestingly enough, this money came from the $6.7 million of so-called
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"excess" funds in the Section 106 (b) revolving loan fund (HUD, 1975b). HUD's
unsupportive attitude toward these programs was also revealed when they
questioned whether Section 106 (b) seed money was necessary "in addition to . .
.
private sources offunds. . . [and whether the reasons for Section 106 (b) were]
sufficient to justify a $150,000 a year program" (HUD, 1975b, 21).l3
Although HUD's unwillingness to actively support Section 106 only adds
another page in the long history ofthe agency's nonconsumer orientation, it is
noteworthy that lawmakers foresaw the need for funding and technical assistance for
nonprofit housing sponsors. If Section 106 had been funded and used extensively, two
key ingredients of a community-based housing system would have been put in place.
However, as it turned out, technical assistance and funding to cover start-up costs
had to be aggressively pursued by nonprofits because they could not be obtained
through federal appropriations. The lack of funding for these programs contributed
to the overall impression of a fragmented, nonsystem in which nonprofit community-
based housing activities were forced to operate. With skimpy financial resources and
few outside supports, many nonprofit groups got "burned out" after finishing one
development. The knowledge that the group acquired was rarely used again and new
groups wanting to produce housing would start at the beginning again, in essence
"reinventing the wheel" each time.
A few community groups, however, did depart from this general pattern. For
instance, Community Development Corporations (CDCs), which were well funded
through the Special Impact Amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1966,
and later through Title VII of the Community Services Act of 1974, have had more
resources available to them and have been considerably more permanent. Another
group ofcommunity-based organizations that were supported by the old Office of
Economic Opportunity as well as the Model Cities program were the Housing
Development Corporations (HDCs). As forerunners to many ofthe community-based
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housing groups that exist today, the early HDCs represented significant initial
efforts to institutionalize the technical and financial resources needed to make
nonprofit housing development possible (Keyes, 1971). Nevertheless, they probably
revealed as much about what was wrong with the way in which community-based
housing development was operating as what was right. A major evaluation ofHDCs
summed up the situation: "They are saddled with goals and objectives that are far
beyond their resources to achieve" (quoted in Keyes, 1971, p. 169).
Nonprofits Form Limited Partnerships: 1970s
Starting in the early 1970s community-based housing sponsors, which up to
that time had been nonprofit groups, began to form limited partnerships with for-
profit developers. The push for this new form of ownership grew out ofthe two key
problems faced by the early nonprofits: inadequate financial reserves and a lack of
technical expertise.
The concept oflimited partnership was uniquely suited to address these issues.
First, by entering into such an arrangement, the community sponsor could attract
the participation of a for-profit developer as a co-general partner. The experience of
for-profit developers who had proven "track records" was enormously helpful in
negotiating the complexities ofthe development process. The second advantage of
limited partnerships was that they could enjoy substantial financial benefits, thereby
creating reserves for construction overruns or for future management expenses.
A limited partnership works this way: through a process known as syndication,
owners of a housing development can sell shares to wealthy investors (limited
partners) who, in turn, enjoy significant tax savings. All rental property
"depreciates" for tax purposes and these paper losses shelter portions of an owner's
other income. By definition, nonprofits have no taxable income that needs sheltering,
therefore the depreciation losses that flow from a project are essentially wasted as
29
long as it is owned solely by a nonprofit group. If, however, the nonprofit forms a
limited partnership, the limited partners "buy into" the project and then, as partial
owners, are entitled to a percentage ofthe depreciation generated by the project. The
buy-in funds are shared by the general partners-the nonprofit group and the for-
profit partner. The latter sees the money as a key source of profit and motivation for
participating in the project; while the nonprofit uses the money as a cushion against
increased costs, as a way to provide the project with more amenities, or as seed money
with which new projects can be launched. The decision to develop housing as a
nonprofit or through a limited partnership depends on the goals and particular
situation facing a community-based housing group.14
One ofthe most successful community-based housing groups that has used the
limited partnership approach is IBA, Inquilinus Borriculas en Action (Puerto Rican
Tenants in Action), located in Boston. IBA has its roots in a protest organization that
came together in the late 1960s demanding a community-oriented use for a parcel of
Urban Renewal land. Eventually, IBA won the right to develop the land and
constructed almost 400 units of subsidized housing and rehabilitated another 200
units.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s most community-based housing groups
benefited enormously from the availability of Section 8 New Construction and
Substantial Rehabilitation subsidies. A significant improvement over the Section
221 (d)(3) and 236 programs, Section 8's funding formula took into account increases
in operating expenses. With HUD committing to pay the difference between a "fair
market rental" and 30% of a tenant's income (also see note 5) financial difficulties
and operating shortfalls were virtually guaranteed not to occur. However, as part of
President Reagan's cutbacks in domestic spending, the Section 8 New Construction
and Substantial Rehabilitation programs are not receiving new funding. This phase-
out of federal subsidies for housing production will have serious consequences, both
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because of the loss ofneeded units and because ofthe inability offledging community-
based housing groups to sustain themselves during this dry period.
Precise figures on the accomplishments ofthe present generation ofcommunity
groups involved with housing rehabilitation and construction are not available at
this time. One study found that 46 groups had produced 5,290 units of rehabilitated
housing and 872 units ofnew housing (Marshall, 1981). A 1983 survey of
neighborhood development organizations found that 54 groups had rehabilitated
7,742 units and constructed 1,388 units ofnew housing (Cohen and Kohler, 1983). If
there was no overlap between the samples (which is unlikely) and if the two studies
did not omit too many groups (which is also unlikely) we could estimate that
approximately 100 community groups have been responsible for building or
rehabilitating some 15,000 units of housing. Whether this figure represents an
underestimate or an exaggeration is less important than providing a rough idea of
how much-or how little-housing has been produced or rehabilitated by community-
based organizations.
Although we do not have complete data on the level ofcommunity-based
housing activity, it is safe to conclude that these efforts address only a small fraction
of the overall low-income housing need. Nevertheless, the current generation of
community-based housing developers appears to hold real potential for making more
significant contributions. It should also be underscored that modern community-
based housing groups are very different from earlier nonprofit housing sponsors. For
instance, more modern groups are generally financially sounder and more
knowledgeable about housing development, in large part because of their association
with private developers in limited partnership arrangements. They are also less
likely to quit after one development, often launching additional housing and social
service projects, and are becoming more professionalized with staffs competent in
housing finance, development, and management. Finally, another important
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difference between community-based housing groups in the 1970s and 80s and their
predecessors is that the former have been the beneficiaries ofresources provided by a
handful oforganizations operating at the national, state, and local levels. At the
national level, private nonprofit groups such as the Enterprise Foundation, the Local
Initiatives Support Corporation, the Center for Community Change, and the
National Housing Law Project have been providing significant technical and
financial resources to community-based housing initiatives. Several cities, notably
Boston, New York, Chicago and Minneapolis, also have at least one public or
nonprofit agency that assists community-based housing groups. Finally, at the state
level, Massachusetts has pioneered a series ofprograms that has begun to emerge as
a support system for community-based housing activities. These programs will be
discussed after the following assessment of the community-based housing strategy.
ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNITY-BASED HOUSING STRATEGY
Returning to the criteria listed at the beginning of this paper, some important
strengths and weaknesses of the community-based housing strategy emerge.
Ability to Provide Direct Housing Assistance
One key advantage ofcommunity-based housing programs has been their
ability to directly address specific housing problems. For example, residents who
were confronted with a lack ofmortgage or rehabilitation money in their
,
neighborhoods initiated reinvestment programs that specifically addressed their
problem. Similarly, tenants who were dissatisfied with conditions in their subsidized
buildings formed their own management corporations that also tackled the problems
head-on. In these ways people have dealt directly with the housing problems facing
them, and their achievements have been tangible.
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The most recent generation ofcommunity-based housing developments have
not yet been assessed in terms of the quality ofhousing produced. Yet the anecdotal
evidence is extremely provocative and suggests the potential inherent in this
strategy. For example columnist Neil Peirce has enthusiastically described the
design ofIBA's housing:
Ascend to the roof ofthe high rise building for the elderly in Villa Victoria . .
.
and an astounding view awaits you. Immediately below are the Hispanic Plaza
and distinctive pitched roofs, the bright yellow, orange and brown colors of the
townhouses ofVilla Victoria-proof that a housing project doesn't need to look
like one. The sense of territoriality is overwhelming when one walks across the
central plaza, with its bright Puerto Rican mural, and strolls through the new
looped streets . . . (1983).
Despite this glowing vignette and the directness of its approach, the limited
scope and small scale ofcommunity-based housing programs raise the question of
whether the strategy could substantially alleviate our overall housing problems.
Thus far in this paper outcomes ofvarious programs have been described
quantitatively, whenever possible, in order to underscore how much (or how little)
housing has been affected. For example, although New York City touts the most
successful programs for dealing with abandoned multifamily housing, the number of
buildings that have actually been fixed up and/or are under tenant management or
control is small. Similarly, while IBA has been praised for its magnificent housing
developments in the South End, the number of units built or rehabilitated is
minuscule, particularly when one considers the demand. In 1981, when IBA
announced that 190 new rental units were available, thousands of people applied.
To sum up, although community-based housing programs have been successful
in directly addressing and alleviating housing problems, their ability to perform on
anything but a small scale has not been proven. Of course, if substantial financial
and technical supports were provided it is possible that more sweeping achievements
could be realized.
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Potential for Producing Social and Community Benefits
One of the most important strengths ofcommunity-based housing programs is
their ability to yield positive impacts not only directly related to housing, but also in
terms ofimproving overall living conditions. For example in addition to providing
good housing, IBA runs programs for the elderly, provides day care services, and
manages a closed circuit television station for residents of the development. As
Mario Clavel, an IBA staffmember noted, 'It's notjust a matter ofplacing bricks on
top ofone another to build a house. It's dealing with those who are going to live
there-from all aspects. We are not dealing with buildings but people" (Soulos, 1981).
Similarly, the community relations director ofthe West Harlem Community
Organization observed that "Aside from community management, we provide lots of
other services to tenants [W]e're putting together a manual of services that are so
scattered all over the city that some people just don't know they're there-dental and
health care at places other than a hospital, for instance. We're now trying to get the
merchants to clean up the streets, the sidewalks, the storefronts, and to put up blood
pressure mobile and polio vaccination notices, for example" (HUD, 1979, p. 46).
Commenting on the expansion oftenant-management corporations into other
types of socially oriented services, Robert Kolodny has written:
The problems ofhousing a population overwhelmingly made up of welfare-
dependent, female-headed households confronted the TMC's with the need to
rethink their roles as managers. To a far greater extent than most other public
housing in the country, the St. Louis projects have developed programs in
education; recreation; health; . . . special care for children and the elderly; job
training; and direct employment. (1981a, p. 137)
Based upon observations such as these, Kolodny has concluded that "Housing
improvement may not, in itself, be the most significant result ofexpanded consumer
roles in housing production, operation, and ownership" (1981a, p. 142).
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Community-based housing programs also have a potential for serving as an
anchor in neighborhoods that are going through gentrification. As many urban
neighborhoods become increasingly attractive to middle and upper income people,
thousands oflongtime residents are losing their homes and businesses. As demand
increases for residential and commercial space, landlords often raise rents
dramatically, sell their buildings to speculators or, in some cases, convert to
condominiums. Regardless of the tactic used, the net result for lower income people is
the same: their neighborhoods out-price them and they are forced to move. However,
in those neighborhoods where there is community-based housing activity, residents
may face a decreased risk ofdisplacement. For example, IBA, which operates in an
area ofBoston that has become a prime "gentrifying" neighborhood, serves an an
important stabilizing force by providing decent low-cost housing to community
people. Once a community-based housing group has gained recognition for
competence in housing development or management, it is unlikely that any major
program or plan could be initiated in that area without the knowledge ofthe
community group. In this way the housing initiative can serve as a "concrete"
reminder that the group must be bargained with, considered, and consulted
whenever the city or any other entity begins to have designs on or for that area.
Thus, one can see how a strong "bottom up" group can nurture additional community-
based projects and at the same time ensure that any "top-down" planning or
development efforts that do not take their interests into account will face
considerable obstacles.
Potential for Producing Benefits to Individuals
Another important benefit ofcommunity-based housing programs is their
ability to produce significant psychological benefits for the individuals involved.
Although very little systematic evidence is available on this effect, community-based
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housing programs should provide participants with increased enjoyment, security,
and a sense ofempowerment. One resident in one ofJubilee Housing's buildings
described her perceptions this way: "How has the building changed since Jubilee '
took over? Well, I would say it is much better because we work together; we work
with Jubilee to get the building in better shape. Now everybody takes their share of
the work and we are getting along O.K." (Jubilee Housing, p. 13).
Similarly, an elated Philadelphia squatter who obtained legal ownership ofher
home stated: "Words can't explain how I feel. We have plenty of room. We're happy.
Ifpeople were allowed to get a home to fix up, something that's theirs, there wouldn't
be so much vandalism Housing is the main issue for everyone and I won't forget
how it was before" (quoted in Hartman et al., 1982, p. 69). And, according to Barbara
Ward, an expert on human settlements:
[T]he policy ofencouraging home ownership can be used effectively to help
poorer citizens. It does more than simply provide them with secure shelter.
Even deeper needs are at issue here. It has been said ofthe poorest citizens,
sadly but with too much truth, that they are "the people whose plans never
work out" [They] feel utterly powerless in the face of a system which,
private or public, seems simply to push them around Perhaps the
fundamental point in tenants organizing themselves for action is not simply to
get themselves their own homes. It is the very act oforganization. . . self-
organization can be the creative answer. It turns the flow of authority back to
the citizen, however impoverished. It can be the beginning of a plan that
actually works out . . . (1976, p. 116).
Community-based housing programs can also heighten the political awareness
ofpeople as they "fight the system" to institute change and create new programs.
According to Gale Cincotta, chair ofNational Peoples Action, 'The political leaders
in this country are bankrupt. The answers, the leadership and the guts to win will
come from us. [N]o one who is out there organizing throughout this land expects to be
rescued We know that the only way we survive is by helping ourselves" (1981).
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Ease of Implementation
Community-based housing programs are clearly major undertakings and are
difficult to carry out. Much ofthe difficulty stems from the fact that community
groups facing serious housing problems often find themselves "reinventing the
wheel" and negotiating their way, unassisted, through the complexities ofthe
housing system. Financial and technical assistance are especially necessary, but are
usually scarce. Where technical assistance has been more readily available, such as
in New York and Boston, it has been crucial to the success of housing initiatives.
Thus, it must be underscored that the words "community-based" do not mean
that funding from other sources is unnecessary. By definition, lower income people
require public assistance ifthey are to attain a decent home and suitable living
environment. Any high-level proclamation in support of local initiatives is absurd as
long as the phrase is equated with self-funding. Robert Schur (1980) warned how
easy it would be for city government officials to lull themselves into believing that
simply allowing people to own and manage tax foreclosed structures is sufficient. He
also noted that if technical support as well as financial resources are withheld, sweat
equity programs could turn into a form of"lemon socialism." Similarly, Homefront,
New York's Citywide Action Group Against Neighborhood Destruction and for Low-
Rent Housing, has charged that the most serious problem with the sweat equity
cooperative conversion programs is that "they place most of the responsibility for
housing improvement on individuals and local communities, which have the least
resources, and get the government (which has the resources) off the hook" (quoted in
Hartman et al., 1982, p. 67).
Benefits versus Costs
There is insufficient information on community-based housing programs to
perform a systematic analysis of costs versus benefits. Moreover, even with more
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quantitative data, a full assessment would be difficult because so many ofthe
benefits ofcommunity-based housing are qualitative in nature. Specifically, the
array ofnonhousing benefits that are enjoyed by residents and tenants, as well as the
positive impacts on the community, are key strengths of the community-based
housing strategy, but are not quantifiable.
Potential for Replication
Community-based housing programs have served as a model to the federal
government for national demonstrations. The most significant example of this is the
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation which was designed to assist locales in
setting up their own Neighborhood Housing Services Programs, thereby replicating
the original Pittsburgh initiative. Similarly, although on much smaller scales and
with somewhat less success, HUD has launched both tenant management
demonstrations modeled after the St. Louis TMC and demonstrations based on New
York City's multifamily homesteading experiences. This indicates that locally-based
housing programs are not only able to address the problems ofone community, but
are also likely to provide solutions for similar housing problems in other parts of the
country.
Although community-based programs can be replicated, the "state of the art" in
duplicating successful programs is in its infancy. A great deal more needs to be
understood about the types ofprograms that are the best models, how these models
can be adapted to other locales whether the replicated programs initiated in a "top-
down" manner can truly be labeled "community-based," and what type of agency or
level or government is best suited to assist in the replication ofcommunity-based
housing initiatives.
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Ability to Address Root Causes of the Problem
Although community-based housing programs may heighten aspects ofpolitical
awareness discussed earlier they probably do not do very much toward addressing
fundamental causes ofhousing problems. They generally do not, for instance,
attempt to alter institutional relationships or change traditional business patterns
within the private housing industry. While it may be a significant step for a financial
institution to participate in a special mortgage loan program that has been launched
by a community group, that involvement does not guarantee that it will assist other
groups or change its overall lending practices.
Some of the most pointed criticisms of the community-based housing strategy
are, in fact, based on this shortcoming. For example, Homefront has been critical of
the sweat equity cooperative conversion programs because of their implicit
acceptance ofthe market system. According to that organization, "By working
through these programs, communities implicitly accept the proposition that tenants
must solve their own housing problems To the extent that they believe they must
learn to survive in the market, they do not demand the replacement of an exploitative
market by government-provided housing" (quoted in Hartman et al., 1982, p. 67).
This is a legitimate position that must be taken seriously. Yet at the same time
it is not easy for individuals facing serious shelter problems to sit back and do
nothing to meet their immediate needs. One can "demand the replacement of an
exploitative market" all one likes but there is no guarantee (let alone even a good
chance) that this will result in a roof over one's head. Most community-based housing
programs emerge from deep frustration and desperation. People usually embark on
the difficult course of trying to solve their own housing problems as a last resort.
In conclusion, despite the obstacles and limited resources, community-based
housing programs have shown the capacity to grapple with and solve some difficult
housing problems. Overall, there does appear to be significant potential in the
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community-based housing strategy. One can visualize a comprehensive support
system for this approach that would provide the needed technical and financial
resources, thereby making explicit the government's role in providing housing, while
enabling residents to create their own community-based programs.
BUILDING A MODEL SUPPORT SYSTEM
FOR COMMUNITY-BASED HOUSINGS
A model support system would provide funding and technical assistance and
create an evaluation and information sharing network.
Funding
The need for adequate funding is obviously a crucial ingredient for the success
ofcommunity-based housing activities. In general, three distinct types of financial
resources are necessary. The first, seed money, is needed to cover organizational
expenses. In order for a community group to initiate a housing program, early
funding to cover start-up costs is essential. Grants for initial operating expenses
enable groups to formally establish an organization, develop specific strategies, and
line up other resources appropriate to the specific development to be undertaken.
Seed money, often obtained through grants, covers such expenses as office rental,
secretarial assistance, and a director's salary. Since these grants carry time
limitations and dollar ceilings, they encourage groups to move on to development
projects as quickly as possible.
A second type offunding necessary for successful community-based housing
activities is construction and debt financing for project implementation. Although
the cheapest and most direct way ofsubsidizing housing is probably through out-
right grants, the high short-term costs of this approach make it an unlikely option for
political reasons. Thus, financial resources for construction loans and long-term debt
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financing are needed. There are at least three ways in which such funds can be
obtained: through a publicly capitalized bank specifically set up for this purpose;
through a private financial institution with or without some type of federal mortgage
guarantee; and through a special "GNMA-FNMA" program. The third option works
in the following manner. The Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA)
makes a commitment to purchase a certain amount ofbelow-market, interest rate
mortgages originated by community-based housing groups. These loans are then sold
to the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) at prevailing market rates,
with GNMA providing a subsidy equal to the difference between the yields on the
market rate and the below-market rate transactions.
The final component of the funding package for successful community-based
housing activities is direct subsidies to individual units and households that would
lower final rental costs. Such subsidies are similar to those available through the
Section 8 program.
In short what is needed in terms offunding is a two-pronged subsidy program:
one that encourages the production or supply of housing and the other that provides
individuals with extra buying power to make units more affordable.
Technical Assistance
Technical assistance is the second major ingredient needed for a comprehensive
community-oriented housing system. Those in need of such services can be broken
down into three groups of actors.
Community organizations are, logically, the first group needing technical
assistance in the community-based housing system. Over the past few years a great
deal has been learned about the types of technical assistance needed by local
organizations that are attempting to launch neighborhood development projects.
Several types of"hands on" assistance are valuable to neighborhood development
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organizations including: proposal writing and assisting with outsiders, especially
funding sources; legal assistance; accounting; defining board and staff roles and
training board members; and organizational structuring (Mayer and Blake, 1981). In
addition, information specifically related to housing must be available, such as: how
the housing development process works; what subsidy programs are available and
how they work; and how to negotiate with key actors including financial institutions,
architects, lawyers, city officials, syndication firms, contractors, and co-general
partners.
A community-based housing group that has successfully built or taken over the
management of a housing development may need assistance running the project,
especially in such areas as tenant selection, lease enforcement and ongoing
management, and maintenance. As the group matures, it may also need help in
areas like assessing whether or not it should undertake additional developments and
learning how it can provide nonhousing services to better meet the needs of the local
community.
In order to institutionalize a high quality of technical assistance, a national
technical assistance organization could be established. One of the functions ofsuch
an organization would be to help locales set up city-wide or regional technical
assistance agencies modeled after Greater Boston Community Development and the
Urban Homesteading Assistance Board that would, in turn, provide information,
advice, and technical support to neighborhood housing organizations. These
independent local organizations would serve as intermediaries between the
community group and other public and private actors.
In addition to providing technical assistance to the community-based housing
agencies, training and educational programs would have to be launched for other
important participants in the community-based housing process. Two ofthe most
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important actors are city government and the local business community, notably
financial institutions.
Many aspects ofcommunity-based housing activities require a high level of
commitment and support by local government. For example, buildings and land that
are in tax arrears can either become enormous resources to community groups or
significant blights on a neighborhood. Unless the city understands how it can
quickly identify such properties and sees the benefits of allowing community-based
groups to take title of them, usable units can quickly become extremely costly or
uneconomical to repair. Cities need to be taught how early warning systems operate
and must learn from other locales how the necessary supports can be provided to
community-based housing efforts.
Financial institutions and other private entities also need assistance in
understanding how community-based housing groups operate and how their
cooperation can both assist the local activity and create new markets for their goods
or services. In this sense, the private sector needs to appreciate how their own self-
interest may be enhanced by supporting community-based housing activities.
Evaluation and Information Sharing Network
The third major component of the support system for community-based housing
involves the creation of a communication and information dissemination network. It
is crucial that community-based groups, as well as all other actors involved in such
projects, have opportunities to share information and experiences. In addition,
research on community-based housing activities and evaluations of ongoing
programs are critical ingredients to a successful community-based housing system.
Clearly the support system for community-based housing programs outlined
above would not be evaluated favorably in the current political climate. Quite
simply, this proposal is diametrically opposed to the views articulated by President
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Reagan, his recent Commission on Housing, and HUD for the following reasons: it
looks to community groups, rather than to the for-profit private sector, to play a key
role in housing; it assumes that everyone has a right to decent, affordable shelter;
and it calls for a new federal commitment to meet this goal. Given these
circumstances, the logic and proven record of the community-based approach to
housing can only be viewed at this point as a potential national strategy. At the very
most, we can look forward to a time when these ideas will receive public support. At
the very least, we must continue to keep the vision alive.
EVOLUTION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPPORT
SYSTEM FOR COMMUNITY-BASED HOUSING
The Community Economic Development Movement
During the late 1960s, the needs of inner-city, low-income neighborhoods began
to receive increased attention. Although the federal community development
programs left a mixed legacy for urban neighborhoods and their residents, they did
serve to focus attention on problems of the cities. Urban renewal was an easy target
for criticism, as thousands oflow-income units were lost and whole "urban villages"
were demolished. In their place, luxury apartments, offices, and civic centers became
the concrete symbols ofthe inequities of the "urban/Negro removal" program.
The federal community development programs that followed, "War on Poverty"
and "Model Cities," although more focused on trying to assist low-income
neighborhoods, were often viewed as only token improvements.Whether due to
inefficiency or over-ambitiousness, program goals rarely lived up to expectations. In
addition, although "community control" and "maximum feasible participation"
became the buzz words ofthe mid-1960s, lawmakers gave ambiguous messages about
whether neighborhood residents or the local chief executive would actually hold the
reins of power. As inevitable controversies arose, the neighborhood emerged as a
significant locus of activity, ifnot control. Whether community groups coalesced to
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protest urban renewal plans or to vie for power with city hall, one ofthe clear
outcomes was a new awareness of the problems facing the inner city.
Consciousness about poor urban dwellers in general, and blacks in particular,
was raised by a second key factor: the civil rights movement. Although there were
no geographical boundaries to inequality, the plight ofblacks was almost
synonymous with inner-city problems. This link became fixed when, in the summers
of 1966 and 1967, frustrations in black communities gave way to full-scale urban
riots.
At about the same time, a third set ofevents was unfolding that also
contributed to an increased awareness of the problems facing urban neighborhoods,
particularly in older industrialized states, such as Massachusetts. Traditional
manufacturing firms began to close down and relocate to Sun Belt locations, in large
part as a way to attract cheaper nonunion labor. The result for cities that were losing
such firms was often disastrous, as tax bases declined and fiscal crises became a
major topic of concern.
By the early 1970s community activists, some political leaders, and a handful of
academics began to see potential in a completely new urban agenda. Two positive
approaches emerged: black capitalism and community economic development. The
former emphasized helping black entrepreneurs enter the economic mainstream,
while the latter focused on a collective, community-based response to poverty that
viewed local control as the critical ingredient.
The Massachusetts Community Economic Development Program: 1978-1983
In Massachusetts, the community economic development movement received
significant support from a group of local politicians, activists, and academics. This
coalition was crucial to the creation of the state program, which consisted of three
components. The first was the Community Development Finance Corporation
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(CDFC). Following more than a year ofnegotiation and debate, a state bill was
signed in 1975 that created the corporation. In exchange for giving CDFC the
proceeds from the sale of$10 million worth of state general obligation bonds, the
state received all ofthe agency's common stock, thereby becoming its sole owner.
CDFC's mandate was to function as a development bank that would make equity
investments, which are relatively risky and difficult to obtain, as well as loans that
would be retired by debt financing. CDFC's funds were to be targeted to Community
Development Corporations (CDCs) operating in blighted areas.
Very briefly, a CDC is a nonprofit organization controlled by local residents to
help guide the improvement ofan economically distressed area. Membership in a
CDC is open to all adults living in the specific geographic area and the majority of its
board members must be elected by its membership. Other board members may be
appointed, but they must be public officials or represent other nonprofit groups
operating in the area. Although all CDCs share the broad objective of enabling
residents to exercise greater control over the local economy and improving the
quality of goods and services in their communities, the specific goals and activities
launched by a CDC can be quite variable.
The requirement that CDFC channel its funds through CDCs gave clear
support to the view that projects should be controlled by and operated for the benefit
ofcommunity residents. In summary, CDFC's operation was unique because of its
willingness to take equity positions in risky ventures, its explicit focus on
economically distressed areas, and its restriction to working with only one type of
client, the CDC.
Due to a legal delay in the sale ofCDFC bonds, the first investments were not
made until 1978. Even then, by the end of 1981 only 21 investments with a value of
$3.6 million had been made. There were several reasons for the CDFC's early
difficulties. First, despite the original assumption that lack of capital was a major
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detriment to development in depressed areas, there was relatively little demand for
funds. In part this was because there were only a handful ofCDCs in the state at the
start ofCDFC's operation. Further, the CDCs that were functional had a great deal
of difficulty attracting experienced staff and locating skilled entrepreneurs who could
put together sound business ventures.
Another key problem during CDFC's early years was that many of the original
investments ended in failure. Out ofthe first 25 ventures financed, 14 were closed
and liquidated and two had to be reorganized; the remaining nine loans had either
been repaid or were current as of early 1984. According to Nancy Nye, vice president
ofCDFC, 'This compares reasonably well to the SBA's [Small Business
Administration! documented 55% failure rate of small business, particularly
considering that all the CDFC ventures are located in distressed areas and by the
very nature of the investment are higher risk than a general sample" (Nye, 1984).
Along with the slowness in making investments and the high rate of failure of
the early loans, CDFC also had a disappointing record in stimulatingjob creation. As
of the end of 1983 the agency could claim that only 474 jobs had been created or
retained through CDFC investments (CDFC, 1984).
The second component ofthe Massachusetts Community Economic
Development Program was the Community Economic Development Assistance
Corporation (CEDAC). The need for a new agency that could provide technical
assistance to CDCs was acknowledged by Massachusetts lawmakers even before
CDFC realized that demand for its capital was weak and that there were only a
relatively small number ofCDCs who were eligible to receive investments. CEDAC
was created in 1978 to provide technical assistance to CDCs. Specifically, CEDAC's
main functions were to assist groups in becoming CDCs, and then to assist them in
the initial stages of economic development planning and in the final preparation of
business plans for CDFC financing.
47
CEDAC has always been much less financially secure than the well-capitalized
CDFC. Technical assistance is a "softer" type of activity than financing and it is
difficult to measure direct outcomes of those efforts. Although technical assistance
may be an essential ingredient to a given project, the fact that it occurs early in the
process can blur its contribution to producing new jobs or housing.
CEDAC also faced major hurdles because of a shift in the state's political
administration. Supported by the liberal Governor Dukakis, CEDAC did not start its
operation until early in the King administration's term in 1979. While Governor
King's view ofCEDAC processed from direct opposition to tolerance, without his
active support CEDAC was forced to seek funding from the legislature on its own.
Governor King further compromised a sound working relationship between CDFC
and CEDAC by requiring the former to contract for services from CEDAC, in lieu of
direct state funding. According to CEDAC personnel, this damaged their credibility
and compromised their effectiveness (CEDAC, 1983).
All of these factors contributed to CEDAC's shaky funding history. Whereas
CDFC was capitalized with $10 million of state secured funds, during CEDAC's first
four years of operation (1978-82) it only received $250,000 from state appropriations.
During that period, CEDAC did receive another $700,000 from two federal programs,
the Concentrated Employment Training Act and the Economic Development
Administration, but neither of these programs provided guaranteed sources of
income.
Despite the impediments, CEDAC managed to "hold on" during the lean King
years, providing technical assistance to community organizations and, perhaps even
more importantly, learning from their experiences and mistakes. By the end of its
first four years CEDAC concluded that:
• For CDCs to be in a position to undertake development, they must have a
clear organizational agenda, an indigenous reason for existing, and strong
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leadership. CEDAC's technical assistance could not replace or create these
attributes.
• The agency needed to be more aggressive in assisting CDCs to initiate
developments by identifying viable projects that could be undertaken by
eligible organizations.
• Nationally, CDCs that were involved with real estate development were
more successful than those involved with business ventures. Housing and
land use seemed more important to community groups than jobs, which
were viewed as less of a local issue (CEDAC, 1983).
The third and final component ofthe Massachusetts economic development
system was the Community Enterprise Economic Development Program (CEED). A
forerunner of this program became operational in 1976 (two years before CDFC's first
loan was made). In response to a request for proposals issued by the Massachusetts
Executive Office ofCommunities and Development (EOCD) for "production-oriented
as opposed to social service- or advocacy-oriented" community development projects,
44 applications totaling almost $1 million were filed. However, with $69,000
available, only four grants could be made (EOCD, 1984). Three of these awards went
to community groups involved with business ventures and one was used for a land use
study. None were used for housing.
Despite the small size of the pilot program (or, perhaps, because of it) there was
a great deal of enthusiasm for the creation, by the state, of an ongoing capital fund to
help nonprofit groups finance planning and start-up activities. In 1978, the
Massachusetts legislature created the CEED program, with an appropriation for FY
1979 of $142,450. Between 1978 and 1983, 39 organizations received over $1.5
million in CEED grants. During the early years of the CEED program, staff assisted
numerous groups with the initial stages of organizational development including
incorporation, formulation of community development plans, and board training.
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Yet, it was not until 1982-83 that the "organizational efforts [began tol bear fruit, as
the material outputs ofCDCs began to blossom" (EOCD, 1984).
Unlike CDFC and CEDAC, CEED was able to have a significant impact on
housing during its early years. In 1982 CEED-funded CDCs rehabilitated or created
over 350 units ofhousing, and in 1983 the number increased by more than 50%, to
530 units.
Overall, by 1983, the state-funded economic development program could boast
several important achievements:
• The number ofCDCs in the state increased from a total of eight in 1976 to
over 50;
• The total state investment in CDCs leveraged $127.9 million in other
public and private investments for industrial, commercial, and housing
development; and
• Across the state, CDC projects created or retained 4,000 jobs (EOCD, 1984).
Conceptually, the state's economic development program included many of the
key pieces of a support system for CDCs. First, the CEED program helped in the
earliest stages of a group's development and provided a unique source offunding to
hire staffand pay overhead costs. Next, CEDAC provided the young organization
with technical assistance, such as marketing analyses, economic feasibility studies
and financial packaging, as it moved toward project development. And, finally CDFC
provided financing to help launch sound business ventures. Although there was at
times overlap in providing technical assistance, particularly between CEDAC and
CEED, the functions ofthe three agencies were, for the most part, distinct and
complemented one another.
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From Economic Development to Housing Development: 1984
As discussed in the previous section, Massachusetts' economic development
system was primarily oriented toward providing technical assistance and financing
to CDCs involved with business and job creation activities. Only the CEED program
included an explicit housing and real estate development focus. A 1983 CEDAC
progress report noted three main reasons for its early job-creation focus:
[Biased on the earlier successes of established CDCs, it appeared that
community-based groups could successfully develop housing without assistance
from a support institution like CEDAC. Furthermore, CDFC, which was the
primary financing target for CEDAC assisted projects, would not finance real
estate. Lastly, there was a sense among board members thatjob creation was a
primary objective for CEDAC and an overriding and inadequately addressed
problem in locales that qualify as CEDAC target areas (CEDAC, 1983). '
Several factors contributed to CDFC's and CEDAC's decision to move into
housing. Some ofthese factors had to do with the experience with economic
development, while others related to the positive attributes of housing as a vehicle for
community development. First, there was enormous frustration about the difficulty
offinding the right kinds ofbusiness deals to finance. An analysis of the early
community economic development program in Massachusetts observed that:
[T]echnical assistance, useful in turning good venture concepts into sound
business plans, could not generate good venture concepts In order to
stimulate demand at CDFC, CEDAC's effort turned to finding local
entrepreneurs who wanted to start businesses. Yet, it soon became apparent
that it is primarily the quality of the entrepreneur, not the business plan, that
makes for a good investment. CEDAC staff discovered the lessons bankers
learned years ago: management experience and expertise is indispensable and
very hard to find. Community zeal can achieve great things but the delicate
navigation of and single-minded attention to a business' health, like the
expertise acquired by surgeons or highly trained workers, cannot be found or
developed easily in most communities. (Bratt and Geiser, 1982)
The second factor that contributed to CDFC's and CEDAC's decision to move
into housing was that the record of CDFC's investments was, overall, disappointing.
Although this record may not have been significantly worse than the failure rate for
all small businesses, given the level of support being provided through the state
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system, one would have hoped that a much higher percentage ofinvestments would
have brought success. In order to justify state funding, CDFC's investments, while
high risk, would have to be better put together than the average small business deals.
Housing, it was hoped,would provide more opportunities for successful investments.
A third reason why the economic development approach was abandoned was
because of the constraints imposed by the low-income neighborhood. Firms that
leave an area usually do so because ofan inability to make a profit, and by definition
residents in low-income areas have little extra money with which to purchase goods
and services. Thus, CDC's often were sponsoring ventures with inexperienced
entrepreneurs in areas already abandoned by more savvy business persons.
Finally, the low-income nature of the neighborhood notwithstanding, almost
any business venture is faced with an uncertain market once it is operational. In
contrast, a decent unit of affordable housing is virtually guaranteed to find an eager
tenant.
In addition to the desire to pursue something different in view of these negative
experiences with economic development, there were some positive pressures for the
state agencies to move into housing. First, according to Nancy Nye, "Housing was
what the CDCs were doing or wanted to do and, to be responsive, CDFC needed to
move in that direction."16 Similarly, Carl Sussman, executive director ofCEDAC,
stated: "We finally became convinced that the resources to do housing development
were not really available to most ofthe CDCs in the state. GBCD was not set up to
give technical assistance to community groups doing projects that were too small or
too marginal."i7 The interest in housing on the part ofcommunity groups was also
simulated by the dramatic need felt in many low-income communities. Private
market forces, combined with the withdrawal of the federal government from
subsidized housing production, severely affected an already limited supply of
affordable units.
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A second positive pressure urging state agencies toward housing was the fact
that, as a community development initiative, housing is infinitely more satisfying
than the relatively invisible "economic development." While a storefront or an old
warehouse may be newly occupied by a CDC-supported venture, this type of activity
does not have the same visual impact as watching a formerly vacant lot become the
site ofnewly constructed housing or an abandoned building undergo renovation.
Housing is clearly a "concrete" and visible neighborhood-oriented activity.
Finally, during the early 1980s, HUD began to pursue a policy of allowing
foreclosed multifamily Section 221 (d)(3) and 236 developments to be sold to the
highest bidder, to be used for market-rate housing. The threat of this happening in
Boston mobilized an effective campaign that persuaded the local HUD office to give
priority to new buyers who were committed to maintaining the low- and moderate-
income nature of the developments. Faced with this situation and committed to
preventing the possible loss of thousands of low-income units, state officials
responded to the need to salvage the HUD-foreclosed housing.
The shift into housing was rapid. At the end of 1984 CDFC's portfolio was
almost complete for the first time, with $9.2 million invested or committed. Of this
amount, some $1.4 million, or 15%, was allocated to housing development projects
(CDFC, 1984). As for CEDAC, virtually all their activity is now in housing. Within
the past few years they have been directly responsible for helping CDCs rehabilitate
about 700 units of housing, with another 1,300 units underway. With this sense of
accomplishment, most observers agree that the shift from economic development to,
housing development was the right decision.
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THE EMERGENCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS SYSTEM
OF SUPPORT FOR COMMUNITY-BASED HOUSING
Filling in Some Missing Pieces
Although the key pieces ofthe Massachusetts support system for community-
based housing were rooted in the community economic development movement,
several additional agencies and programs have also played important roles. These
are briefly discussed below.
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA)
Created in 1966 through an act ofthe Massachusetts legislature, the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) was one ofthe first state housing
finance agencies in the country. Since 1970, when construction on the first MHFA-
financed housing began, the agency has made loans totaling $1.2 billion, which
translates into 38,516 rental units (MHFA, 1983). MHFA (as well as other state
housing finance agencies) operates by issuing tax-exempt securities. The proceeds
are used to make below-market interest rate loans to private nonprofit or for-profit
developers who agree to set aside 25% of the units for low-income tenants, defined
according to public housing limits. Although CDFC provides a much needed source of
capital that has often made the difference between a project being launched or not,
MHFA is set up to provide construction or permanent financing for large-scale
housing developments. This source of financing, with its clear public purpose, is a
critical component of the state's overall support system for housing, including
community-based initiatives.
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Massachusetts Government Land Bank
The Massachusetts Government Land Bank, or the "Land Bank," as it is called,
was created in 1975 in response to a Defense Department announcement that it
would be closing five military installations in the state. The Land Bank's mandate
was to "aid private enterprise or public agencies in the speedy and orderly conversion
and redevelopment of certain lands formerly used for military activities to non-
military uses" (quoted in Massachusetts Government Land Bank, 1985). With
capital provided through $40 million in General Obligation Bonds, the Land Bank
was given a financing capacity to cover any expenses it incurred in the course of its
redevelopment work. With the agency's authorization due to expire on June 30,
1980, and with several of the conversions nearing completion, a handful of state
legislators sponsored legislation that prevented the Land Bank's demise and
broadened its powers. According to Rep. Richard Demers, chair of the House
Commerce and Labor Committee, there was a clear rationale for the Land Bank's
continuance: 'The Land Bank had served its original function ofconduit to the
communities in which bases had been shutdown. However, in the process, it had
acquired the skills that could be applied to other areas of development" (quoted in
Massachusetts Government Land Bank, 1985, p. 7).
With the new state legislation, the Land Bank was empowered to acquire,
develop, and sell surplus state property (as well as surplus federal property located in
Massachusetts) and blighted open or substandard properties. Since its mandate was
broadened the Land Bank has financed 27 projects, including 17 with a housing
component, thereby facilitating the rehabilitation of 714 units of low- and moderate-
income housing. Several ofthese projects were developed by nonprofit community-
based groups.
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Additional EOCD -Operated Programs
In addition to the CEED program, EOCD also administers an array ofprograms
that are targeted to or can be used by community-based housing groups.
Special Project of the Community Services Block Grant. Five percent of
the Massachusetts Community Services Block Grant for FY 1985, or about $300,000,
was targeted to community-based nonprofit groups. One of its main focuses was to
provide funding for "projects which demonstrate innovative ways to expand
availability and affordability of existing housing for low-income families and
individuals" (EOCD, 1985, p. 1).
Small Cities Community Development Block Grants. A portion ofthe
federally funded Small Cities Community Development Block Grant is targeted for
organizational support for community-based nonprofit development organizations
operating at a regional or multicommunity level in rural sections of the state.
Commonwealth Service Corps. During FY 1985 about 700 individuals were
paid from funds provided through the Commonwealth Service Corps program to serve
in community-based neighborhood development and service delivery projects. Not
only do these paid "volunteers" gain valuable work experience, but they also provide
much needed person-power to nonprofit groups, many ofwhich operate on skeleton
budgets.
Neighborhood Development Front Money Loan Fund. Using $300,000 in
Federal Community Services Block Grant monies, a revolving loan fund was
established to provide seed financing for real estate development projects sponsored
by nonprofit community-based organizations. Aimed at filling a "critical financing
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gap," the specific purpose of this fund is to provide the "front end capital required to
bring residential and commercial real estate projects, designed to benefit lower
income residents and to support local neighborhood revitalization objectives to the
point where development financing is committed by other public and private sources,
at which time the seed loans will revolve for reuse in other neighborhood real estate
projects" (Tierney, 1984).
Neighborhood Housing Services. EOCD has created a special program to
support the ten Neighborhood Housing Services Corporations in Massachusetts. For
FY 1985, $760,000 was appropriated to supplement other public and private funds to
assist individual homeowners to rehabilitate their properties as well as to support
other neighborhood rehabilitation projects.
Housing Abandonment Program. Initiated by EOCD in FY 1985, the
Housing Abandonment Program reimburses community-based and tenants'
organizations for expenses associated with financing the rehabilitation of tax
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delinquent, abandoned, or deteriorated residential properties. Funded at a level of
$500,000, the program is aimed at helping economically depressed neighborhoods
recapture a stock ofmuch needed housing.
Organizational Development Fund. Another new EOCD program, the
organizational development fund, was created to supply a source ofmoney (up to
$1,500 per grant) to help young CDCs cover some of the out-of-pocket costs associated
with forming a new organization, such as lawyers' fees.
Greater Boston Community Development, Inc. (GBCD). Although not part
of the state system, GBCD has played a significant role in supporting and advancing
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the state's community-based housing agenda. Incorporated as a nonprofit
organization, GBCD provides technical assistance to community-based sponsors of
housing for low- and moderate-income residents. Its primary goal is to "enable
community organizations to control the development and management ofhousing
which will best serve the needs of lower income families, elderly and handicapped
people" (GBCD, 1980, p. 5). Although it operates in many respects similarly to a
private developer, GBCD's first priority is to help community-based groups achieve
their own housing and community development goals. Since 1964, GBCD has helped
17 different nonprofit housing sponsors develop 2,750 units ofhousing in 25
developments.18 In addition, GBCD manages about 1,180 units of housing, some of
which the agency also played a role in developing.
One ofGBCD's most important contributions has been the way in which it has
used the limited partnership to benefit community-based housing sponsors. GBCD
claims that it has "structured limited partnerships so as to maximize the financial
benefits to the sponsor and the development while protecting the sponsor's tax
exempt status and control over the development" (GBCD, 1984, p. 12). With a staff of
almost 60 (including about 38 people involved in property management and
maintenance), GBCD was instrumental in launching the Boston Housing
Partnership (BHP). The BHP is a partnership ofvarious public and private actors
with the goal of providing affordable housing. Its first project involves some 700
units ofhousing that are being rehabilitated by 10 community-based groups. GBCD
has played an active role in virtually every aspect ofthe demonstration program and
is in charge of putting together a unique financing package that involves the blanket
syndication of all 10 projects.
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An Outline for an Evaluation of the System
A thorough assessment of the Massachusetts system for supporting community-
based housing activities is not possible at this time. First, since CDFC and CEDAC
only entered into housing within the past two years, the system is still in its infancy.
Second, very little data presently exists for most ofthe relevant measures, including:
Housing impacts:
• Number, physical quality, and cost ofunits produced and rehabilitated; and
• Maintenance ofthe units over time.
Neighborhood/market impacts:
• Evidence ofother public and private investment in housing, retail, or
commercial areas, and public facilities;
• Evidence of gentrification or forced displacement (e.g., changes in socio-
economia groups); and
• Evidence of neighborhood stability (home ownership rates; community
perceptions).
Social impacts:
• Provision of social services and their effects;
• Individual tenants' feelings of well-being and security; and
• Evidence ofempowerment among leaders or participants in the housing
development process.
Organizational impacts:
• Ability to manage the development;
• Track record in producing/rehabilitating additional units; and
• Ability to act as a voice for residents in other public or private controversies
or development schemes.
In order to broaden our understanding of the capabilities and limitations of
community-based housing, the state or some other independent group should launch
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a longitudinal research project that will systematically gather this type of
information. But since the above list ofmeasures is, at the present, still a "wish list,"
we are faced with the immediate problem of assessing how the Massachusetts system
of supports for community-based housing is working. In the absence of"hard facts"
the following is presented less as an evaluation than as a way ofunderstanding what
the Massachusetts experience already reveals about how government can support
community-based housing. Pointing out some of the areas that are likely to present
future problems is also important both for those involved in the state system as well
as for others with hopes ofbuilding similar programs.
OBSERVATIONS FROM THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE
The Massachusetts system encompasses many of the key components of the
theoretical model outlined in section IV, including several funding and subsidy
vehicles and provisions for technical assistance. However, it does not focus on
technical assistance for groups other than the community organizations and it does
not have sufficient subsidy money. Although the state operates several subsidy
programs, it must depend on federal resources that are, at best, uncertain at the
present time. Another drawback to the Massachusetts system is that it does not yet
include a comprehensive evaluation system. A thorough assessment ofthe impacts of
the Massachusetts system should be undertaken, along the lines outlined on page 59.
The state appears to be a good level ofgovernment through which to channel
community-based housing programs. There has been very little work on the idea of
institutionalizing a system of support for community-based housing initiatives.
However, three distinct proposals can be identified. The first, suggested by Keyes
(1971), outlined the development ofmetropolitan or state-level community housing
corporations that would act as conduits for Section 106 funds and provide technical
assistance and financial packaging services to local housing groups, similar to
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GBCD's present operation. The second, outlined by Mott (1984) and sponsored by the
National Low-Income Housing Coalition, called for the creation of a new community
housing supply program that would target federal funds for housing production and
rehabilitation to projects controlled by neighborhood residents and/or tenants.
Federal, state, and local governments would share in disbursing the subsidy money
but, unlike Keyes' proposal, no new agency would be created. A third suggestion, to
create a community-based housing supply program, was outlined in the section
entitled "Building a Model Support System," on page 40. Similar to Keyes, in this
proposal GBCD would also be seen as an important model for new local technical
assistance organizations. Interestingly enough, none visualized the type ofcomplex
system created in Massachusetts. Indeed, even the top political figures and
administrators in the state didn't appear to foresee the emergence of the present-day
community-based housing system. Perhaps even more remarkable is that despite its
presence and activity, it is only beginning to be viewed as a "system" per se, in
contrast to a series of separate programs. But whether planned or not, something
that can be called a "system" has certainly emerged on the Massachusetts landscape.
Although it is possible that the other theoretical models would offer clear
advantages, it does appear that the state is a good level through which to channel
community-based housing programs. Some observations on the reason for this
include:
• The state is in a position to pass legislation, create new programs, and put
significant resources into them;
• The power and prestige of the governor and his/her executive departments
can facilitate program development and coordination;
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• The state has an opportunity to be in touch with the needs in local
communities;
• State housing finance agencies have proven to be effective entities for
channeling housing resources and providing housing services (Betnun,
1976); and
• The state "feels" like a manageable size through which to operate
community-based housing systems.
However, contrasting a state system with a federal support system, the former
does reveal some weaknesses, including:
• Some states would never adopt a community-based housing system,
thereby leaving many people and localities without the needed resources.
Only a federal support system would have the ability to reach the entire
country.
• The amount ofmoney needed to launch and sustain a community-based
housing system is so large that no state (with the possible exception of
Texas) would have the resources necessary to do the job thoroughly.
• Not only does a state-based system have inadequate resources, it is also
vulnerable to shifts in policies at the federal level that can significantly
undermine its operation.
A progressive/liberal Democratic administration is more likely than a
conservative Republican administration to support a community-based housing
system. The Massachusetts experience, for instance, has shown that a liberal
Democrat, such as Michael Dukakis, has done much more to support the community-
based housing agenda than the conservative Edward King (who recently switched
from the Democratic to the Republican party). Under Governor King (1979-1982)
CEDAC was almost eliminated, there was very little program development, and
there were few efforts toward coordination. In contrast, it was during Dukakis' first
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term (1974-1978) that the three major community economic development initiatives
were launched: CDFC, CEDAC and CEED. Further, during Dukakis' second term
(1983-present) EOCD staffwho have extensive prior experience in community-based
housing and have a genuine commitment to the approach have, with the governor,
begun to think through "A State Strategy for Neighborhood Development" (Tierney,
1984) and have developed a host ofnew programs where important gaps were
identified. For example, since 1983 EOCD has launched the Housing Abandonment
Program and the Organizational Development Fund. In addition, EOCD has been
directing several of the other programs it administers-such as Small Cities
Community Development Block Grants, Community Services Block Grants, and the
state Section 705 public housing program-explicitly to CDCs involved in housing
development. Another important aspect of the emerging state system is a
willingness to allocate increased funds into the various programs. Most striking is
that CEED is now operating on a $1.25 million yearly budget; this is almost as much
as the total CEED expenditures between 1978 and 1983-which was $1.5 million.
Finally, Dukakis' EOCD is aware that coordination is a critical component of a
community-based housing system. Alert to potential overlaps in the system,
particularly between EOCD and CEDAC, EOCD staff spent much of the first six
months of 1983 working out the institutional links between CDFC, CEDAC, and
EOCD. A key result was that CEDAC's board was reconstituted to make the agency
less independent and to define its operation more explicitly as an arm ofEOCD;
EOCD's deputy assistant secretary for Neighborhoods and Economic Opportunity
now chairs the CEDAC board.
At the federal level, we have had ample evidence that liberal Democrats are
much more likely to support housing subsidy programs than are conservative
Republicans, such as Ronald Reagan, who virtually dismantled the nation's housing
programs. Further, over the past 20 years it has been the Democrats who have
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created programs that were, at least at the level of rhetoric, oriented toward
empowering poor people. The War on Poverty and Model Cities, despite their
significant weaknesses, did at least give "lip service" to some ofthe values that
underlie a community-based approach to housing. More recently Jimmy Carter's
Neighborhood Self-Help Development program, which provided a modest supply of
funds directly to community groups, and which was quickly removed from the federal
agenda by President Reagan, is another example of the sympathy that liberal
Democrats tend to have for exploring neighborhood-based solutions to housing and
community development problems. However, while the Democrats look awfully good
when compared to their Republican counterparts, no federal administration has yet
sponsored a comprehensive system ofsupports for community-based housing.
Potential for replication may be questionable: It is quite possible that ifthe
original focus of the state system had been housing, instead ofcommunity economic
development, the system never would have been created. Although the state's
community economic development program was not going to compete with private
entrepreneurs-since it was to provide employment business opportunities in areas
that had been abandoned by the private market^the creation ofCDFC and its
capitalization were, nevertheless, the subjects of intense legislative debates. While
the community economic development program ultimately prevailed, it did so only by
a slim margin.
The question is: Could a support system for community-based housing that to
many may appear to be taking business away from private for-profit developers get
needed support? Even though the unassisted private sector is not interested in
producing low-income housing, for-profit developers are certain to be against any
program that provides subsidies to build low-income housing that does not include
them. The home builders and real estate trade associations have always been
vehemently opposed to the conventional public housing program, which does not rely
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on private developers and owners. Conversely, these groups have been strong
advocates of the subsidized housing programs in which a role for them was explicit.
It is likely that it would be difficult to replicate the Massachusetts system
because of private sector opposition. Even in Massachusetts, it is unclear whether
the system ever could have been launched from scratch. Indeed, the state's support
system for community-based housing may only be a lucky accident. Community
economic development was proving difficult to carry out and there was strong support
for the state to become more involved with low-income housing, notwithstanding any
opposition by the private sector. Although it may only be a coincidence, at about the
time that the state began to support community-based housing, Governor Dukakis
spearheaded an initiative designed specifically to assist private developers in
undertaking rental developments. The SHARP program provides a significant
financial incentive for all private developers-both for-profit and nonprofit>-of
predominantly market-rate rental housing. While it is easy, and possibly erroneous,
to ascribe causality, SHARP may have helped deflect opposition to the emerging
community-based housing agenda. Thus, in considering how a state supported
community-based housing program could be replicated, it is important to consider
who the likely opponents would be and how their objections could be handled. Aside
from these political considerations, the Massachusetts state program could,
conceptually at least, be replicated.
Targeting of Resources Appears to Be Important.
The young and growing Massachusetts support system has pursued a strategy
of deciding what programs are important and has then sought funding to implement
them. This approach speaks to the debate about whether it is better to fund broad
goals through block grants or to specify more explicit program guidelines and to fund
them through categorical grants. Massachusetts has enjoyed the flexibility provided
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through several federal block grant programs, but as for developing its own strategy,
it has chosen to initiate new categorical programs when it felt a particular need. The
new Housing Abandonment program is a good example of the way in which the state
has defined a problem and then created a program in response.
A Public Support System for Community-Based Housing Initiatives Cannot,
Guarantee That the Actual Programs Will Be Truly Community-Based
The experience with the state's early community economic development
program revealed the difficulty inherent in a level ofgovernment trying to stimulate
local responses to problems. If an effort is to be community-based, what role, if any, is
appropriate for a public body? According to Annette Rubin-Casas, director of
EOCD's Office ofCommunity Economic Development for Community Non-Profits,
before CDFC became involved with housing, many CDCs were created that were not
truly community-based. It was not uncommon, for example, for a local entrepreneur
needing assistance to launch a business to go through the steps ofcreating a CDC
that could then serve as a conduit for state funds.19 However, in pursuing a housing
agenda CDCs may be developing as more explicit community-based organizations.
Mike Tierney has stated: "In venture development the CDC is dependent on
entrepreneurial skills; in housing development the CDC is the entrepreneur."20 The
CDC that coalesces around housing goals and develops a project is almost certain to
be responding to the needs ofthe community. It is unlikely that there could be
ulterior motives. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the state's community-
based housing system will be successful in providing "top down" supports to truly
"bottom up" activities.
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Individual Commitment and Expertise Is Essential
The Massachusetts community economic development program emerged from
the social commitment and vision of a handful ofcommunity activists, academics,
and legislators. As the program adopted a housing agenda, the conviction ofmany
first-class professionals that community-based housing was "the way to go," coupled
with their willingness to put in extra hours, was essential. As one astute observer
recently put it: "Hernandez, Edgerly, Whittlesey, and Clancy are the best in the
country at making community development happen." 21 Nevertheless, a system such
as the one operating in Massachusetts is not the work ofjust one or even a few people.
Although there have been some impressive leaders, the system could not work
without the scores ofcommitted and competent staffpeople at the public and quasi-
public agencies and at the CDCs themselves.
Quasi-Public Agencies Are Important Components
Quasi-public agencies such as CEDAC, CDFC, and MHFA play critical roles in
the state system. Although it is theoretically possible that many if not all ofthe
functions performed by CEDAC could be carried out by EOCD, it would not be
possible for a state line agency to perform the banking functions ofCDFC and MHFA.
Also, the ability of these agencies to pay more than the state's maximum salaries has
allowed them to be more competitive with the private sector and to attract high
quality personnel and hire costly consultants when necessary. Finally, quasi-public
agencies are more able to move quickly and to avoid some of the "red tape" that is an
unavoidable part of a state bureaucracy.
The System Needs to Be Flexible
Even in the short period during which the Massachusetts system has been
operating, the need for flexibility has become apparent. The shift from community
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economic development to housing development was a radical one and it is a credit to
the people involved that there was a willingness to change. The ability to
acknowledge.problems in the system and to make necessary adjustments was also
apparent when CEDAC became more closely controlled by EOCD.
New pressures for change are inevitable and the system still has some
important challenges facing it. For example, there is still some overlap in the
system, particularly in the area of technical assistance. Second, a handful ofCDCs in
the state have matured and are being confronted with new responsibilities, such as
how to manage their services and investments. The state will have to begin to
develop assistance programs to address the needs ofthe more seasoned CDCs. Third,
and finally, the state system is going to have to be extremely clever and adaptable to
get through the lean years at the federal level. The last two observations point to
what could become the "Achilles heel" of the Massachusetts system for community-
based housing. As good as the overall program may be, the system is dependent on
federal policies. The inability of the state to function completely on its own suggests
that a comprehensive community-based housing system would have to be supported
by, ifnot necessarily implemented by, the federal government.
The System Does Not Include "Deep" Subsidies
The kind of subsidies available through the federal Section 8 New
Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation program, which guaranteed tenants low
rents while providing owners with adequate operating funds, is not provided by the
state. Although Massachusetts has several subsidy programs, none provides deep
subsidies to community-based housing sponsors (or, for that matter, private
developers). Massachusetts' Section 705 is the state's public housing program and
usually operates through local housing authorities;22 Section 707 provides rental
assistance similar to the Section 8 existing program; and the SHARP program
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provides loans (which effectively lowers the interest rate on the mortgage to as low as
5%) to private for-profit or nonprofit developers who agree to set aside no less than
25% ofthe units to low-income tenants. Without a public supply ofmoney that can be
used to substantially lower rents, the Massachusetts system, however comprehensive
and exemplary, may face serious problems. The economics of housing
production/substantial rehabilitation for low-income people simply do not work
without substantial public subsidies.
The System Depends on Existing Internal Revenue Code Regulations, Which
Are Subject to Change
Although one can visualize a subsidy system that would include generous front-
end or rental subsidies that would make development financially feasible, almost all
privately owned/publicly subsidized housing produced over the past 15 years has
been done through limited partnerships. The ability ofcommunity groups to attract
limited partners, as well as experienced for-profit developers to serve as co-general
partners, is dependent on the continuation of tax laws that include generous
depreciation provisions. Any changes in the IRS code, such as those presently being
proposed, could dramatically reduce the attractiveness of real estate investment in
general, and subsidized housing in particular. Without the existing tax advantages,
and without other deep subsidies, community-based housing, as it is presently
produced in Massachusetts and elsewhere, would almost certainly be infeasible.
FINALTHOUGHTS
This study of community-based housing and the evolving Massachusetts
support system has argued the following:
• The current generation ofcommunity-based housing sponsors operate in a
different way from the preceding nonprofits;
69
• There are many positive attributes ofcommunity-based housing, and
although many ofthe benefits are only theoretical, over the past 25 years
nonprofits have been credited with many concrete successes;
• Housing may be the most suitable vehicle for launching a community-based
development project;
• Massachusetts is the only governmental body to have created what has
grown into a fairly comprehensive system ofsupports for community-based
housing;
• The Massachusetts system presents an exciting model which, theoretically,
could be emulated by other states;
• Despite the many strengths of a state-based system, the federal
government must play a role by providing deep housing subsidies and/or ,
tax incentives. In addition the possibility of the federal government
playing a role in implementing a nationally-based support system for
community-based housing should also be considered; and
• A more thorough evaluation ofthe impact ofthe Massachusetts system
should be undertaken.
In conclusion, the Massachusetts system ofsupport for community-based
housing may continue to operate only at the margin of our present housing system. If
that is the case, it will constantly be facing an uphill fight to sustain its programs.
More optimistically, the Massachusetts model could become a centerpiece of a revived
federal housing policy and a tangible symbol of a new commitment to the universal
right to decent shelter.
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NOTES
1. Some of the material in this section is revised from Bratt, 1985.
2. A key criticism of the subsidized production programs that warrants
explanation here is that they have been inequitable. The largest housing subsidy by
far goes to relatively affluent households, those earning over $30,000 per year. The
"home owner's deduction"-the ability ofhomeowners to deduct mortgage interest and
property tax payments from their incomes in calculating their tax liability-
represents a substantial loss in revenue to the U.S. government. Over $36 billion in
taxes were lost in 1982 and it was estimated that at least $50 billion was lost in 1984
(Dolbeare, 1983). It is absurd for critics of public housing and the other production
programs to argue that these programs are inequitable because large benefits are
enjoyed by a few low-income households when even larger benefits are received by all
upper income homeowners. Further, while the President's Commission on Housing
was quick to point out that past housing programs were not equitable "because they
provide a few fortunate tenants very high quality housing at a price less than their
neighbors pay for lower-quality housing" (1982, p. 3), its proposed Housing Payments
Program (HPP) was equally open to criticism: the commission did not recommend
that the HPP be an entitlement program. Thus, one ofthe key criticisms of the
housing production programs-that they are unfair because they exclude so many
eligible households-is very weak. The problem is inherent in any housing program
that is not an entitlement, and is a function ofbudgetary priorities.
3. The first housing allowance program was the Section 23 Leased Public Housing
Program. The Section 8 Existing Housing Program, created in 1974, provides
certificates to low-income households, thereby enabling them to afford an apartment
in the private rental market. In addition, the Urban-Rural Housing Recovery Act of
1983 authorized a new housing voucher demonstration program. At least some of the
enthusiasm for housing vouchers comes from the results of the Experimental
Housing Allowance Program (EHAP). Authorized by Congress in 1970, EHAP tested
how a housing allowance program could be administered and how it would impact
both housing consumers and the local rental housing market.
4. Although the President's Commission on Housing called rent control "the most
evident interference in the ability of the private market to supply rental housing"
(1982, p. 91), Appelbaum and Gilderbloom (1983) have shown that there is no
difference in the rate of multifamily housing construction between rent-controlled
and non-rent-controlled communities. Therefore, simply eliminating rent control
would not stimulate multifamily construction activity.
5. Under present HUD regulations, rentals are based on 30% ofincome for new
tenants, an increase from 25% of income. Rentals for existing tenants will rise 1%
per year for 5 years until 30% ofincome is paid. This new income limit was set in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. In July 1983 the House passed a bill
that would have reinstated the 25% ofincome formula for all public housing
programs. The final legislation enacted by Congress, the Housing and Urban-Rural
Recovery Act of 1983, did not, however, reinstate the 25% of income formula.
However, it did modify deductions on which income is based, thereby reducing rents
for many households.
6. The Neighborhood Self-Help Development program provided $15 million in
direct federal grants to neighborhood development organizations during 1979 and
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1980. The Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation Act of 1978 set up a permanent
structure for supporting and funding Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) home
rehabilitation programs. This legislation, as well as the earlier efforts ofthe HUD-
Federal Home Loan Bank Board Urban Reinvestment Task Force, was largely
responsible for the growth ofNHS programs across the country.
7. Enacted in 1977, the Community Reinvestment Act authorized federal
regulatory agencies to reject applications for bank mergers and branch openings if
the bank has not met the credit needs of its local community.
8. While the NHS concept has wide appeal, it has also been the target of criticism.
For example, critics have charged that some ofthe selected NHS neighborhoods were
not severely deteriorated and that, most likely, they would have been rehabilitated
without public assistance. Furthermore, opponents have pointed out that when a
bank becomes involved with an NHS, it may feel justified in neglecting other inner-
city areas because it has, essentially, "paid its dues" to the community.
9. Model tenements produced for nonprofit, rather than for limited profit, were
extremely rare. Edith Wood, writing in 1919, knew ofonly two (Friedman, 1968, p.
76).
10. Keyes (1971) provides the following data from which the 28% figure was
derived:
221 BMIR
Insurance in force
Commitments outstanding
236
Insurance in force
Commitments outstanding
Total 65,290 229,686
11. Clancy, et al. (1973) pointed out that "a high level of rent supplement or leased
housing units in a Section 236 project create a more difficult management situation
requiring much greater input ofmanagement staff time . . ." (p. 49).
12. However, the same report also noted that limited-dividend sponsored units
serve minorities more than nonprofit sponsored units do. It also added: "No plausible
explanation can be suggested for this situation" (HUD, 1975b, p. 7).
13. $150,000 represents foregone interest.
14. For a thorough evaluation of the various forms ofownership available to a
community-based housing sponsor see, The National Housing Law Project, 1982.
15. A briefer version of this proposal originally appeared in Bratt, 1985.
16. Author's interview, April 17, 1985.
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onprofit
Units
Total
45,669
2,458
160,594
8,834
9,799
7,364
32,830
27,428
17. GBCD is the Greater Boston Community Development, Inc., a nonprofit agency
that provides technical assistance to community groups doing housing development
and rehabilitation. It is discussed in greater detail on pages 57-58. Author's
interview May 2, 1985.
18. These data include the accomplishments ofGBCD's predecessor, South End
Community Development. GBCD was formed in 1970.
19. Author's interview, April 17, 1984.
20. Author's interview, April 24, 1984.
21. Jorge Hernandez is the executive director ofIBA, a CDC; William Edgerly is
the chair ofthe board of the State Street Bank and Trust Company and one of the
initiators ofthe Boston Housing Partnership; Bob Whittlesey was the founder of
GBCD and is currently the executive director of the Boston Housing Partnership; Pat
Clancy is the executive director ofGBCD. The statement was made by Mitchell
Sviridoff, president of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, an organization that
channels private foundation and corporate funds to community-based programs. It
was quoted from "Rehabbing the American Dream," by Christina Robb, The Boston
Globe Magazine, March 31, 1985, p, 65.
22. In FY 1984, for the first time, EOCD provided Section 705 funds to community-
based nonprofit housing sponsors located in areas where local housing authorities
were unable to initiate family housing development (Tierney, 1984).
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